兰德智库报告《大国战争的回归》 第三章（中英对照）

　　译者说明：这一章比较应时，内容主要涉及全球霸主大国与超级大国之间的竞争与新旧更替，崛起大国与守成大国之间的力量博弈。作者根据以往经验推测中国未来的行为模式，实际上反映了美国当前对中国出于防范进而遏制、围堵之深层次原因。事实上美国对中国未来走向不乏主观臆断。

　　CHAPTER THREE Insights from the Wars of Past Global Leaders

　　第三章史上霸权大国战争启示

　　In a situation featuring Chinese near primacy, the possibilities of U.S.-China conflict could be dramatically different from what we regard as plausible today. What sort of conflicts might the two countries fight in such a hypothetical situation? Where might the conflicts occur? Would the two sides carry out the struggle through indirect means, or would the fighting be primarily conventional? One challenge in estimating how the Chinese military might seek to carry out conflict against the United States in a condition featuring a China nearing global primacy is that China is not today close to contending with the United States for such a status. We lack direct evidence of how China in a position of near global primacy might fight the United States.

　　One potential source of data that could help us imagine this possibility lies in the experi-ence of past great powers that achieved some form of international primacy. In this chapter we examine historical examples of leading great powers, focusing on the features of highest interest for our research purposes. After delineating relevant cases, we consider the geo-graphic foundations of their international power, the principal methods that each country used to exert control, the reach and strength of their militaries, and the patterns of conflict experienced by each of the great powers. The observed patterns of past leading great powers could illuminate key aspects of potential U.S.-China conflict, including how China might seek to assert its primacy, where Beijing might be most willing to risk conflict, and what types of conflict China might be willing to wage against the United States.