兰德智库报告《大国战争的回归》 第三章（中英对照）
译者说明：这一章比较应时，内容主要涉及全球霸主大国与超级大国之间的竞争与新旧更替，崛起大国与守成大国之间的力量博弈。作者根据以往经验推测中国未来的行为模式，实际上反映了美国当前对中国出于防范进而遏制、围堵之深层次原因。事实上美国对中国未来走向不乏主观臆断。
CHAPTER THREE Insights from the Wars of Past Global Leaders
第三章史上霸权大国战争启示
In a situation featuring Chinese near primacy, the possibilities of U.S.-China conflict could be dramatically different from what we regard as plausible today. What sort of conflicts might the two countries fight in such a hypothetical situation? Where might the conflicts occur? Would the two sides carry out the struggle through indirect means, or would the fighting be primarily conventional? One challenge in estimating how the Chinese military might seek to carry out conflict against the United States in a condition featuring a China nearing global primacy is that China is not today close to contending with the United States for such a status. We lack direct evidence of how China in a position of near global primacy might fight the United States.
One potential source of data that could help us imagine this possibility lies in the experi-ence of past great powers that achieved some form of international primacy. In this chapter we examine historical examples of leading great powers, focusing on the features of highest interest for our research purposes. After delineating relevant cases, we consider the geo-graphic foundations of their international power, the principal methods that each country used to exert control, the reach and strength of their militaries, and the patterns of conflict experienced by each of the great powers. The observed patterns of past leading great powers could illuminate key aspects of potential U.S.-China conflict, including how China might seek to assert its primacy, where Beijing might be most willing to risk conflict, and what types of conflict China might be willing to wage against the United States.
在中国即将成为全球领袖大国的情况下，美中冲突的可能性跟我们今天看到的两国关系正常态势似乎截然不同。那么，在假设中国即将坐上全球第一交椅的前提下，哪种冲突会爆发在中美之间？冲突会在哪里产生？中美双方采取什么间接手段“拼搏？或者还是依然以常规方式作为主要抗衡手段？不过，我们目前面临的挑战是：预估中国军队在自己国家接近全球首要地位时，将与美国产生何种冲突——毕竟当前中国还明显没有跟美国争夺全球霸主地位。因此，我们实际缺乏直接证据：论证中国在接近全球老大交椅时，会如何驱赶美国下台?
燃鹅，拜赐某种数据源之可供参考性——历史上取得某类国际首要地位的大国经验。在本章中，我们研究领袖大国的具体案例，重点关注对当下研究最具参考价值的内容。确定案例范围后，先探究其国际权力的地缘基础，每个国家施加控制的主要方法，军队的势力范围，以及每个大国经历的冲突模式。通过先前领袖大国的案例可以“温故知新”预判美中冲突的“风暴眼”所在，包括中国可能采取维护首要地位之举措，北京可能最能承受哪些方面的风险，以及中国可能跟美国产生哪些类型冲突。
Which Are the Leading Great Powers?
哪些是领袖大国？
As presented in Chapter One, we define China’s pursuit of global primacy in terms that draw from both realist/hegemonic stability theory and systems leadership theory. Given their different definitions and points of emphasis, it should perhaps be unsurprising that the two schools of thought disagree on the historical list of great powers. Both groups agree only that the United Kingdom and the United States have reached the summit of global power.
The consensus owes principally to the unusual degree of concentrated political, military, and economic power each has possessed. By contrast, scholars have not arrived at a consensus on the leading great powers for the preindustrial age, in part because countries rarely experienced such immense concentrations of national power. For example, some countries such as Portugal in the 1500s succeeded as mighty trading powers but lacked a powerful military and had far less political influence on the affairs of continental Europe than did rival land powers such as Spain. Similarly, the Hapsburg Empire in the 1600s may have been a dominant military power, but it lacked economic dynamism and could not com-pete economically with the Dutch Republic and other vibrant trading nations.
如第一章所述，我们判定“中国对全球首要地位追求”的依据是现实主义/霸权主义稳定理论和系统领导力两大学派之研究理论。鉴于这两大学派对全球霸权大国定义不同和强调各异。因此，他们开列的大国历史名单不尽相同，但两大学派都众口一词地指出：英国和美国先后达到全球权力顶峰，是当之无愧的全球领袖大国或霸权大国。
两大学派共识主要依据霸主国家形态各异、集中程度不同的政治、军事和经济力量。相比之下，学者们还没有就前工业时代的领先大国评判标准达成一致，部分原因是前工业时代的世界各国很少出现如此高度的国家权力集中。例如，一些国家像葡萄牙在15世纪成功地成为全球贸易大国，但缺乏强大军事力量，对欧洲大陆事务的政治影响远不如陆地大国西班牙等竞争对手。同样，哈布斯堡帝国在16世纪可能是一个占主导地位的军事强国，但它缺乏经济活力，无法与荷兰共和国和其他充满活力的贸易国进行经济竞争。
We will avoid the disputes over preindustrial great powers and instead base our analysis primarily on the cases of the United Kingdom and the United States. To these two undis-puted examples, however, we will add a third great power for comparative purposes—the Soviet Union. The inclusion of the Soviet Union with global leaders such as the United King-dom and the United States is not unproblematic. The Soviet Union lacked the concentration of comprehensive national power and global reach that the United Kingdom and the United States enjoyed, and its share of the global economy never reached more than a fraction of its chief rival, the United States. However, the Soviet Union’s formidable military arsenal, political influence, and substantial population do, by most criteria, meet the threshold for a great power. More relevant to our purposes, including the Soviet Union can be useful for analyzing China’s pursuit of global primacy. Prior to China’s ascent, the Soviet Union was the only great power to have been led by a communist party. Since China under Chi-nese Communist Party (CCP) rule has frequently absorbed many lessons and imitated vari-ous aspects of the Soviet Union, the experience of the Soviet Union it its prime could offer insights into China’s case.
To facilitate analysis, we aim to more clearly define the periods of primacy experienced by the three countries. We define period of primacy as the time when the leading great power became the undisputed globally dominant power or, in the case of the Soviets, the undis-puted Eurasian regional power. In the case of the United States and the United Kingdom, we measure this economically, by noting the years when the country in question had the single largest share of world GDP. The two nations saw their largest share of world GDP in the years 1945–1973 and 1815–1873, respectively. The United States outperformed the United Kingdom by some measure, as it was responsible for between 30 and 40 percent of world GDP at the height of its strength and GDP remained above 25 percent through 1973. Even in the 1990s and early 2000s, the United States retained an impressive 20 percent of world GDP by itself. By comparison, the United Kingdom at its height accounted for about 15 percent of world GDP.
The Soviet Union’s economy performed relatively poorly compared with that of its Western competitors, never rising above 3 percent of world GDP. However, it dominated the economy of Eastern Europe as a regional power. At its height from the late 1940s through the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union experienced its highest rates of per capita GDP growth due to rapid capital accumulation.
我们避免有关工业化前领先大国界定的争论，着重根据英国和美国两国案例进行分析。不过，除了这两个无可争辩的例子外，我们还增加第三个大国进行比较——苏联。把苏联跟英国和美国这样的全球领导者放在一起并非无懈可击——苏联缺乏像英国和美国那样集中的综合国力和全球影响力，它在全球经济中的份额始终仅为主要竞争对手美国的小部分。然而，根据全球领袖大国的大多数标准，苏联强大的军事武库、政治影响和大量人口确实达到了入门级。与我们之目的更相关的是，通过对苏联案例的剖析，可以举一反三地“揣摩”中国对全球首要地位的追求——在中国崛起之前，苏联是唯一由共产党领导的大国。由于中国共产党治下的中国不断吸取苏联的许多经验教训，并模仿苏联的各个方面，因此，苏联全盛时期的经验也许可以为中国的未来提供借鉴。
为了便于分析、旨在更清楚地界定这三个国家所经历的首要时期，我们把首要地位时期定义为无可争议的全球主导力量即领袖大国时期，或者在苏联存在的情况下，成为无可争议的欧亚地区主导力量时期（冷战时期苏联虽然领导华约国家与美国统率的北约国家在政治军事上分庭抗礼，但华约阵营的经济力量根本不能与北约国家同日而语，所以，苏联力量实际上不能主导欧亚地区、亚洲地区的中国还与苏联处于对峙状态——译者注）。就英国和美国而言，从经济上进行衡量，我们注意到他们在世界GDP中独占最大份额的年份。这两个国家分别在1815—1873年和1945—1973年占世界GDP的最大份额。作为后起之秀的美国在某种程度上表现超过了英国，因为它在最强大的时候贡献了世界GDP的30%到40%，而且直到1973年GDP都保持在25%以上。即使在20世纪90年代和21世纪初，美国自己也保留了世界GDP的20%，这实在令人印象深刻。相比之下，英国在其鼎盛时期才约占世界GDP的15%。
与西方竞争对手相比，苏联的经济表现相对较差，从未超过世界GDP的3%。然而，它作为一个地区大国，在东欧的经济中占主导地位。在20世纪40年代末至70年代中期的鼎盛时期，由于快速的资本积累，苏联经历了其最高的人均GDP增长率。
In comparison with these historical precedents, China has not arrived at a point of global primacy, despite decades of rapid growth. We tentatively mark the late 2030s as a hypo-thetical period of Chinese near primacy, which assumes the country’s economy overtakes that of the United States. Some economists project that China could have the world’s largest economy by 2030 and that this share could continue to grow through 2050. Others reject this as implausible. Resolution of this issue lies beyond the scope of this report. For purposes of analysis, we will assume that the size of China’s GDP overtakes that of the United States in nominal terms in the late 2030s, although it continues to lag in terms of per capita GDP. We have no way of judging how long a hypothetical period of hegemony could last, although past precedents suggest a range between 30 and 60 years. We emphasize that these are merely planning assumptions, not predictions.
Bookending each country’s period of primacy are phases of ascent and decline; each coun-try in our sample shared a similar position in the international system relative to other coun-tries. Periods of ascent are characterized by expanding economies and improving internal state capacity. Each of the countries had a minor share of world GDP, but that share grew relative to that of their competitors. According to such criteria, countries can be on the ascent for a very long time. To narrow the focus of analysis, we have selected periods of time when the international system featured multipolarity and there was no clear dominant power. For the United Kingdom, this corresponds roughly with the period 1763–1815, when numerous European powers vied for supremacy; for the United States it was 1873–1945. The Soviet Union’s phase of ascent in Eastern Europe may be marked from its formation in 1922 until the end of World War II.
与这些历史先例相比，中国尽管有几十年的快速增长，但还没有达到全球领军的程度。我们暂且将2030年作为中国接近首要地位的假想期，即假设中国的经济超过了美国。一些经济学家预测，中国可能大约在 2030 年成为世界上最大的经济体，并且这一份额可能持续增长到 2050 年——其他人则认为这种说法不可信——不过，关于这个问题的讨论超出了本报告的范围。出于分析的目的，我们假设中国的GDP规模大约2030年在名义上超过美国，尽管它在人均GDP方面继续滞后。我们没有办法判断一个假设的霸权时期可以持续多久，尽管过去的先例表明其范围在30到60年之间。这里我们强调，这些仅仅是假设、而不是预测。
研究表明，任何国家尊享首要殊荣期间，其国家地位都与上升和下降阶段如影随形；相对于其他国家，我们样本中的国家案例在国际体系中都有类似的地位变化情形。上升期的特点是经济扩张和国家内部能力的提高。每个国家在世界GDP中的份额都不大，但相对于他们的竞争对手来说，这个份额在增长。根据这样的标准，各国可以在很长时间内处于上升期。为了缩小分析的范围，我们选择了国际体系多极化和缺乏明显主导力量的时期。对英国来说，这大致相当于1763——1815年，当时众多欧洲大国争夺霸主地位；对美国来说，则是1873——1945年。苏联在东欧的崛起阶段可以从1922年成立到第二次世界大战结束为标记。
China overcame enormous difficulties stemming from civil war, foreign invasion, and economic disaster to establish the People’s Republic of China in 1949. However, the Maoist period saw uneven economic growth and considerable political disarray. By the early 1970s, China still remained one of the world’s poorest countries, but the turn toward market reforms in 1979 coincided with a dramatic increase in GDP growth, which averaged nearly 10 percent,annually through early 2018. China’s international political and mili-tary power lagged behind its economic strength through the 1980s and 1990s, but by the early 2000s its growing national power became clear; the era of U.S. unipolarity was near-ing its end.
For the purposes of our analysis, periods of decline can be defined as periods when new competition from rival states erodes the position of the leading great power. After all, no country remains supreme forever, though the duration of their respective tenures may vary considerably from one to another. In economic terms, a period of decline means that the leading global power no longer has the single largest share of world GDP or that its share had declined from the peak it enjoyed during its years of primacy.
The United Kingdom’s share of global GDP declined after 1873, when it experienced greater competition from rivals, includ-ing Germany and the United States. The United States saw its share of world GDP decline sig-nificantly beginning in the 1970s. Although it retained the single largest economy for decades afterward, its position began to be more actively contested by China in the early 2000s. As a regional power, the Soviet Union’s economy stagnated in the late 1960s, and by the mid-1970s Moscow experienced a severe economic slowdown; this was followed by poor economic performance in the 1980s, which eventually led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Of course, since the period of Chinese hegemony is based on speculation, we have no way to judge when it might enter its period of decline.
These definitions and time frames provide us with a sample of previous great powers with which we can now compare China and its prospects (see Table 3.1). The sample also provides some case studies for comparative analysis, which we will carry out in the follow-ing section.
中国克服了内战、外国入侵和经济灾难带来的巨大困难，于1949年建立了中华人民共和国。然而，在毛泽东时代，经济增长不平衡，政治相当混乱。到20世纪70年代初，中国仍然是世界上最贫穷的国家之一，但在1979年转向市场改革的同时，国内生产总值的增长也急剧增加，平均增长率为接近10%，到2018年初，每年都有新的增长。在20世纪80年代和90年代，中国的国际政治和军事力量落后于其经济实力，但到了21世纪初，其不断增长的国家力量变得十分明显；为此，美国统领全球的单极时代即将结束。
在我们的分析中，衰退期可以被定义为对手国家的竞争侵蚀领袖大国地位期。毕竟，风水轮流转、没有任何国家能永远保持霸主地位，尽管它们各自的“任期”可能有很大不同。在经济方面，衰退期意味着全球领袖大国不再拥有世界GDP的单一最大份额，或者其份额已经从其首要地位时期的峰值下降。
英国在全球GDP中的份额在1873年后有所下降，当时它经历了来自对手的更大竞争，包括德国和美国。从20世纪70年代开始，美国在世界GDP中的份额大幅下降。虽然它在之后的几十年里一直保持着单一最大经济体的地位，但在21世纪初，它的地位开始受到中国更积极的争夺。作为一个地区大国，苏联的经济在 20 世纪 60 年代末停滞不前，到 20 世纪 70 年代中期，莫斯科经历了严重的经济放缓；随后在 20 世纪 80 年代经济表现不佳，最终导致苏联解体。
当然，由于中国未来的霸权时期是基于推测，我们无法判断它何时可能进入衰退期。
这些定义和时间框架为我们提供了一个既往大国的样本，我们现在可以把中国和它的前景进行比较（见表3.1）。这个样本还提供了一些用于比较分析的案例研究，我们将在下一节中进行分析。
TABLE 3.1
Periods of Ascent, Primacy, and Decline for Select Leading Great Powers
领袖大国的上升、首要地位和衰退期
Years of
Years of
Years of
Country
Primacy Type
Ascent
Primacy
Decline
国别
类型
上升期
首要时期
衰退期
United Kingdom
Global
1763–1815
1815–1873
1873–1939
英国
全球
United States
Global
1873–1945
1945–1974
1974–present
美国
全球
1974年至今
Soviet Union
Regional
1911–1944
1945–1976
1977–1990
苏联
地区
China
Global?
1979–2030s?
Late 2030s?–?
?
中国
全球？
1979年—2030
2030以后？
衰退期未知
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of Go, 2012; “Maddison Historical Statistics,” 2020.
资料来源，2022年报告作者对2020年《麦迪逊历史统计》分析的结果。
Key Features of Past Leading Great Powers
早先领袖大国主要特征
Having identified our cases, we now compare them in terms of geographic foundations of primacy, methods of control, military reach and strength, and patterns of conflict. In this section we also consider how China’s case might compare with these precedents.
在选定案例后，我们从首要地位大国的地理环境基础、控制方法、势力范围以及冲突模式等方面进行比较。在这一节中，我们同样研究中国案例与早先领袖大国之比较。
Geographic Foundations
地理基础环境
Past leading great powers may have exerted influence across continents, but scholars of past empires have noted how the dominance of each was structured by specific geographic regions. The geographic regions most essential to sustaining a leading great power typi-cally featured a dense network of trade, investment, security, and political relationships. The geographic regions most essential to the success of one global leader have generally differed from those of its predecessor. This is because rising powers tend to build their partnerships in countries that are less vital to the status quo power, due to the lower risks of provoking conflict with the leading power. The British Empire, for example, depended on a ribbon of territories through the center of Africa and the Middle East, a massive colony in South Asia, and several islands in the Caribbean and Pacific regions.
The United Kingdom gradually assembled its empire through conquest, cultivation of client states, and other forms of state-craft over the span of several centuries, with British power reaching its zenith in the mid- to late 1800s. Economically each of the geographic regions contributed vital trade resources and industry. The Caribbean furnished sugar, and India provided cotton and other manu-factured goods and commodities. The United Kingdom also profited handsomely from trade in tea and exotic commodities from its outposts in China and the Pacific. To secure its over-seas interests, it maintained colonies and supported client states with a modest expeditionary army augmented by native levies. It also maintained a robust navy to ensure secure sea lines of communication for its far-flung empire.
过去领袖大国影响力可能辐射全球各大洲，但研究学者注意到每个帝国的统治地位拜赐特定地理区域之构成。领袖大国赖以维持的最重要的条件是地理区域内通常具有密集的贸易、投资、安全和政治关系纽带。后继全球领导者的成功最重要的在于地理区域通常与前任不同（所获资源不同，译者注）。这是因为崛起的大国倾向于跟与自身利益不太冲突的国家建立伙伴关系，因为发生冲突的风险较低。例如，大英帝国依靠的是穿越非洲和中东中心的领土带，在南亚的大规模殖民地，以及加勒比和太平洋地区的几个岛屿。（上个世纪捌玖十年代中国对外开放、美国与西方国家积极呼应就是因为彼时中国与它们利益互换互补，而现在它们认为中国崛起可能与之产生利益冲突故而加以围堵——译者注）
跨越几个世纪的历史长河，英国通过征服、培养客户国和其它掌控手段逐步建立起大不列颠帝国体系，并在19世纪中后期达到势力顶峰。在经济方面，各个地理区域都对领袖帝国贡献重要的贸易和产业资源。加勒比海地区提供了糖、印度提供了棉花和其他制成品以及商品日用品等。英国同样也从中国和太平洋地区的前哨基地之茶叶和异国商品贸易中赚得钵满盆盈。为了确保海外利益、维持殖民地，英国通过一支由当地人提供给养、规模不大的远征军来“支持”客户国。此外，英国还拥有一支强大的海军，以确保其遥远的帝国海上交通线安全。
By contrast, the geographic foundations for U.S. primacy lay in the Americas, western Europe, and East and Southeast Asia, with Japan being the most important Asian partner. Economically, the United States traded with these regions and built up industrial ties with western Europe, Japan, Latin America, and other Asian countries. With colonialism discred-ited after World War II, the United States protected its interests in these regions through the formation of alliances: NATO in western Europe, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the Middle East, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in Southeast Asia, and bilateral alliances formed with countries such as Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, the Republic of China on Taiwan, and Thailand. The United States fielded a large military presence abroad in bases hosted by its allies, and naval dominance allowed it to ensure security for global commerce and energy supplies originating from the Middle East. But the United States also protected its interests through support for client states and occa-sional smaller-scale military interventions, as it did in Latin America during the Cold War.
相比之下，美国首要地位的地理环境依赖美洲、西欧、东亚和东南亚，而日本是最重要的亚洲伙伴。在经济方面，美国与这些地区进行贸易，并与西欧、日本、拉丁美洲和其他亚洲国家建立了产业联系。随着二战后殖民主义的消亡，美国通过组建联盟来保护其在这些地区的利益。西欧的北大西洋公约组织，中东的中央条约组织，东南亚的东南亚条约组织，以及与澳大利亚、日本、菲律宾、韩国、台湾和泰国等国家（和地区——译者注）组成的双边联盟。美国在其盟国的军事基地中派驻了大量部队，海军的优势使其能够确保全球商业和源自中东的能源供应安全。但美国也通过支持客户国和偶尔的小规模军事干预来保护其利益，如冷战期间在拉丁美洲的所作所为。
The Soviet Union never reached the heights of global power exercised by the United King-dom or the United States. However, it did achieve primacy across parts of Eurasia, and espe-cially Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Moscow maintained friendly ties with a handful of communist nations in Asia, such as North Korea and Vietnam, and in Latin America. Economically the Soviet Union traded with its communist allies and partners through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. To protect its interests, Moscow formed an alli-ance with satellite Eastern European states, the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union also provided military training, arms sales, and other forms of security assistance to communist partners and Moscow-aligned insurgencies across the developing world.
苏联从未达到英国或美国行使的全球权力高度。然而，它确实在欧亚大陆的部分地区，特别是东欧和中亚地区获得了首要地位。莫斯科与亚洲的一些共产主义国家，如朝鲜和越南，以及拉丁美洲的一些国家保持着友好关系。在经济方面，苏联通过经济互助委员会与它的共产主义盟友和伙伴进行贸易。 为了保护其利益，莫斯科与东欧的卫星国家——华沙条约组织建立了联盟。苏联还向发展中世界的共产主义伙伴和与莫斯科结盟的叛乱分子提供军事训练、武器销售和其他形式的安全援助。
China has not yet attained the summit of global leadership, but it has already made clear the geographic areas that it regards as most essential to its international position: Africa, the Caribbean, Central, South, and Southeast Asia, eastern and southern Europe, Latin Amer-ica, and the Middle East are the principal areas designated as part of the BRI, which has largely coincided with the patterns in trade, investment, bilateral and multilateral collabora-tion, and infrastructure development promoted by Beijing (see Table 3.2). Importantly, these are also areas that have tended not to be critical to U.S. power. Following the pattern set by the preceding cases, China has concentrated its build up of partnerships in areas neglected by the United States.
中国还没有达到全球领导地位的顶峰，但已经确认对其国际地位最重要的地理区域。非洲、加勒比海、中亚、南亚和东南亚、东欧和南欧、拉美和中东是 “一带一路”的主要地区，这与中国政府推动的贸易、投资、双边和多边合作以及基础设施发展的模式基本吻合（见表3.2）。重要的是，这些领域往往不在美国实力范围。按照前面的模式，中国将伙伴关系的建立集中在美国不感兴趣的领域，以此避免跟美国产生利益冲突。（中国此举恰恰表明中国没有与美国争夺资源、没有与美国竞争对抗，但美国却反过来围堵中国——译者注。）
TABLE 3.2
Geographic Foundations of Leading Great Powers
领袖大国的地理环境条件
Leading Great Power
Geographic Foundation
领袖大国
地理环境条件
United Kingdom
Caribbean; India; Middle East; sub-Saharan Africa; posts in China and Pacific Islands
英国
加勒比地区；印度；中东；撒哈拉以南非洲；中国沿海和太平洋沿岸的一些岛屿
United States
Americas; western Europe; Northeast Asia; Southeast Asia
美国
美洲；西欧；东北亚；东南亚
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe and Central Asia
苏联
东欧和中亚
China中国
Africa; Caribbean; Central, South, and Southeast Asia; eastern and southern
Europe; Latin America, Middle East (aspirational)
非洲；加勒比地区；中亚、南亚和东南亚；东欧和南欧；拉丁美洲、中东（理想的）。
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of Mackinder, 1996; Major and Luo, 2019; Young, 1932.
An illustration of the importance placed on these geographic regions can be seen in China’s investment patterns. In the 1990s Beijing focused on areas largely neglected by the incumbent world leader and expanded its foreign directed investment in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. However, Chinese foreign directed investment patterns diversified in the early 2000s to extend to Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and the United States. These coun-tries also experienced substantial increases in trade, reflecting their importance to China as sources of raw materials and technology and as markets for finished goods. China’s increas-ing dependence on energy imports has reinforced the importance of these geographic regions. The 2000s have also seen a significant expansion of China’s partnerships for oil imports, much of which have involved Latin America, the Middle East, Russia, and coastal southwestern Africa.
China’s presence in these regions also extends to collaboration on a variety of issues, including manufacturing, production, research, infrastructure construction, among others. Indeed, Chinese officials have characterized “collaboration” as the “key” to the BRI Initiative, to distinguish it from the traditional trade and investment activities typically undertaken by countries everywhere. China shares with the United States extensive trade and investment ties with Europe and Japan, for example. China also maintains robust trade and invest-ment ties with the United States. However, China’s involvement in the infrastructure develop-ment, technological research and development, and manufacturing processes of the richest nations is limited. By contrast, China has sought to cultivate a closer cooperative relationship with its BRI partners. As Chinese involvement in relevant countries has deepened, China’s security interests have also increased. Beijing has focused on military diplomacy to bolster its security ties with its partners; relevant activities include arms sales, military training and exercises, senior leader visits, port calls, and other forms of security assistance, all of which have seen a dramatic increase in scale and scope since 2000, especially in countries along BRI routes. China has maintained a continuous naval presence in the Gulf of Aden to combat maritime piracy, and Beijing established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017.
从中国的投资模式可以看出对这些地理区域的重视。在20世纪90年代，中国政府的对外直接投资选择当今世界领袖不予重视的领域、扩大与东南亚和撒哈拉以南非洲地区合作。但是，到了21世纪初叶，中国的对外直接投资模式变得多样化了、扩展到欧洲、拉丁美洲、中东和美国。这些国家的贸易也出现了大幅增长，反映了它们作为原材料和技术来源以及成品市场对中国的重要性。中国对能源进口的依赖程度越来越高，这些地理区域的重要性进而越来越大。21世纪头十年，中国在石油进口方面的伙伴关系也显著扩展，其中大部分涉及拉丁美洲、中东、俄罗斯和非洲西南部沿海地区。
中国在这些地区的存在也延伸到各种问题上的合作，包括制造、生产、研究、基础设施建设等等。 事实上，中国官员将 "合作 "描述为 "金砖倡议 "的 "关键"，以区别于各地国家通常开展的传统贸易和投资活动。例如，中国与美国共享与欧洲和日本的广泛贸易和投资关系。中国还与美国保持着紧密的贸易和投资关系。然而，中国对最富裕国家的基础设施建设、技术研究和开发以及制造过程的参与是有限的。相比之下，中国一直在寻求与“金砖”伙伴国家建立更紧密的合作关系。随着中国在相关国家的参与程度加深，中国的安全利益也在增加。中国将重点放在军事外交上，以加强与合作伙伴的安全关系；相关活动包括武器销售、军事训练和演习、高级领导人访问、停靠港口和其他形式的安全援助，所有这些活动的规模和范围自2000年以来都有大幅增加，尤其是在一带一路沿线国家。中国在亚丁湾保持了持续的海军存在，以打击海盗活动，2017年中国在吉布提建立了第一个海外军事基地。
Methods of Control
控制方法
Leading great powers stand apart from other wealthy, powerful countries in their ability to influence and determine events in other countries. By definition, countries that enjoy primacy have a greater ability to influence other countries than countries that do not. Thus they not only have power in the form of superior resources but also exhibit power over other countries to make them comply with their preferences to varying degrees. Compliance may be imper-fect, and control may be weak, but there should be evidence that the preeminent power has the ability to either direct or influence the behavior of subordinate countries.
Julian Go, a theorist in imperial formations, has distinguished between two forms of con-trol. The first, formal control, consists of a relationship in which a great power directly con-trols and administers a subordinate state, usually a colony. This tends to take the form of laws that delineate the inferior rights and obligations of the dependent state. Officials from the mother country also directly administer affairs in the subordinate state. By contrast, informal control relies on indirect methods that nominally respect the sovereignty of the dependent power. However, in practice, the leading great power relies on many instruments and tools to exercise influence. These may take the form of incentives offered through alli-ances, bribes, blackmail, and intimidation. They may include support for coups, assassina-tion, military invasions, and other actions to overthrow a recalcitrant regime and install a more compliant government.
The degree of control under informal control varies greatly by situation and relationship and in general is considerably weaker than that exercised under formal control. Informal control offers its own advantages, however: It generally carries far less cost and risk to the leading great power since there is no need to maintain costly and politically contentious occupying armies; It is also more sustainable politically, since the sub-ordinate country maintains the appearance of its sovereignty and independence. This latter point is especially important since the advent of the world decolonization movement, which has resulted in global norms against formal empire.
领袖大国在全球国家层面重大事件的影响与决定能力跟富裕、强大的领先国家明显不同（比如俄乌战争中美国对乌克兰方面的决定性影响明显超越德法英等国——译者注）。显然，享有首要地位的国家对全球国家的影响力是其他任何国家无以伦比的。因此，他们不仅拥有优越资源的权利，而且还表现出对其他国家的权力，使他们在不同程度上遵从首要大国的偏好。服从可能是不完美的、控制可能是薄弱的、但有证据表明，卓越大国有能力引导或影响附属国家的行为。
帝国形态理论家朱利安笱指出，控制形式有二：第一种是正式控制，包括关联关系，其中一个大国直接控制和管理一个附属国，通常是殖民地的关系——这往往采取法律的形式，划定附属国的相关权利和义务。母国的官员也直接管理附属国的事务。相比之下，非正式的控制依靠的是间接的方法，名义上尊重附属国的主权。然而，在实践中，领袖大国依靠各种方式和手段来行使影响力。这些手段可能是通过结盟、贿赂、敲诈和恐吓等。它们可能包括支持政变、暗杀、军事入侵和其他行动，以推翻一个不听话的政权，建立一个更顺从的政府。
非正式控制下的统治程度因情况和关系的不同而有很大差异——通常而言，比正式控制下的主仆关系更为松散。然而，非正式控制有其自身的优势：它通常给主导大国带来的成本和风险要小得多，因为不需要维持昂贵的、有政治争议的占领军；它在政治上也更具有可持续性，因为下属国家可以保持表面的主权和独立。后一点在世界非殖民化运动出现后尤为重要，它形成了反对帝国殖民的全球规范。
The British Empire exercised both forms of control throughout its ascent, height of pri-macy, and decline. It established colonies in Africa, India, North America, and elsewhere. However, it also maintained informal forms of control through protectorates, in which the United Kingdom acknowledged the sovereignty of the country and permitted local leaders to rule. In exchange, the protectorates provided military access and support to London. The United Kingdom also maintained clients in the Caribbean, the Middle East, Oceania, South-east Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. British authorities exercised control through a variety of methods, including offering financial aid and investment, arms sales, military assistance, and training, and occasionally through coercive acts including military demonstrations or even large-scale military interventions.
The United States practiced a mix of formal and informal control in the early decades of its ascendance. It supported client states in Latin America in the late 1800s, for example, but also seized the Philippines as a colony from Spain in the Spanish-American War. How-ever, after World War II, U.S. ascendancy coincided with an evolution in the international system premised on the rejection of colonialism. In a global order defined by nation-states, the United States supported national independence movements and then used techniques of informal control—such as financial, military, and advisory aid—to bolster friendly political regimes.
大英帝国在其崛起、巅峰和衰落的过程中都行使了两种形式的控制。它在非洲、印度、北美洲和其他地方建立了殖民地。然而，它也通过在被保护国维持非正式的控制形式，在被保护国中，英国承认国家的主权并允许当地领导人进行统治。作为交换，这些被保护国向伦敦提供军事通道和支持。英国还在加勒比海、中东、大洋洲、东南亚和撒哈拉以南非洲地区保持着客户。英国当局通过各种方法进行控制，包括提供财政援助和投资、武器销售、军事援助和培训，有时还通过军事示威甚至大规模军事干预等胁迫行为。
美国在其崛起的最初几十年里实行了正式和非正式的混合控制。例如，它在19世纪末支持拉丁美洲的客户国，但也在美西战争中从西班牙手中夺取了菲律宾作为殖民地。然而，二战后，美国的崛起与国际体系中以拒绝殖民主义为前提的演变相吻合。在一个由民族国家定义的全球秩序中，美国支持民族独立运动，然后使用非正式控制的技术，如财政、军事和咨询援助，以支持友好的政治政权。
During its early years, the Soviet Union engaged in war to conquer and annex provinces. After World War II, however, ideological opposition to colonialism and advocacy of national liberation, as well as a lack of accessible territory not “claimed” by other nations, discouraged Moscow from pursuing formal methods of control. From its period of regional primacy to its dissolution, the Soviet Union relied on informal methods of control. Moscow recognized the nominal autonomy of countries in the Eastern bloc, yet the reality of military occupation, economic dependence, and lack of autonomy on the part of the satellite communist states underscored the extent of Soviet domination. Moscow controlled the installation of sympa-thetic leaders and ensured that the military and intelligence services of Eastern bloc countries were populated with individuals loyal to Moscow. When countries demonstrated too strident an opposition to Moscow’s preference, the Red Army invaded, as happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Soviet Union thus exercised informal control of an unusually assertive variety.
China shares with the Soviet Union an ideological opposition to colonialism, and it also lacks accessible territory not “claimed” by its neighboring nations. Unlike the Soviet Union, though, it rejects the principle of military alliances, which Moscow maintained with the Warsaw Pact. Accordingly, China has relied on informal techniques of control, includ-ing offers of financial assistance, infrastructure investments, and various forms of security assistance, such as arms sales. Between 1999 and 2010 China went from having fewer than ten arms export partners to more than 20. From 2015 to 2019, China was the fifth largest exporter of arms. This expansion in the “harder” forms of militarism has been exceeded by an even more rapid expansion of “softer” forms of political and military engagement. Chinese economic developmental aid expanded rapidly, with the number of countries receiving some kind of developmental assistance nearly doubling, from 47 in 2000 to 93 in 2012. This same period is also marked by the PLA’s extensive engagement in military diplomacy. While sys-tematic data on these activities are available only for the years after 2002, researchers see this level of activity with a large number of partner countries as marking a significant expansion in the PLA’s international engagement when compared with that of earlier decades. China has also stepped up the use of coercive instruments, including threats of economic sanctions, diplomatic retaliation, and—possibly—support for at least one coup.
在其早期，苏联参与了战争，以征服和吞并各省。然而，二战后，由于在意识形态上反对殖民主义和倡导民族解放，以及缺乏其他国家 "宣称可利用 "的领土，莫斯科不愿意采取正式的控制方法。从它的区域优势时期到解体，苏联依靠的是非正式的控制方法。莫斯科承认东方集团国家名义上的自治，但军事占领、经济依赖和卫星共产主义国家缺乏自治的现实强调了苏联的统治程度。莫斯科控制了象征性领导人的设置，并确保东欧集团国家的军事和情报部门由忠于莫斯科的人组成。当国家对莫斯科的偏好表现出过于强烈的反对时，红军就会入侵，就像1968年发生在捷克斯洛伐克那样。苏联因此行使了异常自信的非正式控制。
中国与苏联在意识形态上共同反对殖民主义，而且它也缺乏其邻国“宣称拥有”的可进入领土。然而，与苏联不同的是，它拒绝接受莫斯科与华约保持的军事联盟原则。因此，中国依赖于非正式的控制技巧，包括提供金融援助、基础设施投资和各种形式的安全援助，如武器销售。1999年至2010年间，中国的武器出口伙伴从不到10个增加到了20多个。从2015年到2019年，中国是第五大武器出口国。这种“硬”形式的军国主义的扩张已经被更快扩张的“软”形式的政治和军事接触所超过。中国的经济发展援助迅速扩大，接受某种发展援助的国家数量几乎翻了一番，从2000年的47个增加到2012年的93个。
同一时期，解放军还广泛参与了军事外交活动。虽然只有2002年后的系统数据，但研究人员认为，与前几十年相比，中国人民解放军与大量伙伴国家的这种活动水平标志着中国人民解放军的国际参与程度有了很大的提高。中国还加强了胁迫手段的使用，包括威胁进行经济制裁、外交报复，以及——可能——支持至少一次政变。
To date, these methods have yielded at most a modest bounty in terms of Chinese influ-ence and control. Polls indicate that China’s efforts to win international backing have gen-erally fallen short, especially in the developed West. Scholars have dismissed the pos-sibility of Chinese international power by noting the enduring limitations of its appeal. But some of the limitations of Chinese influence can be explained by the fact that it remains a weaker country compared to the United States. China may be able to provide considerable economic assistance to countries, but it cannot provide the forms of diplomatic and mili-tary assistance that the United States can with its broad network of partnerships, which is one of the main benefits of being the incumbent global leader. So long as the U.S. position seems secure, countries around the world have a strong incentive to favor U.S. over Chinese power. Much of this would change in our scenario since it features China nearing global pri-macy. The collaboration currently underway in countries along BRI routes would in our hypothetical situation become more fruitful, resulting in a more substantial and persistent Chinese presence in the infrastructure, manufacturing, and technological development of its partner states, as well as in their diplomatic and political activities. Indeed, in our sce-nario, the degree of collaboration would have advanced to such a degree that many of the states would become dependent on China, which would mark their transition from “part-ners” with the autonomy to reject Chinese demands to “clients” that would be less able to reject the same demands.
A more successful and wealthier China would be better positioned to offer a broader array of benefits to its clients, and it would be politically and militarily more capable of providing a competing, though not necessarily symmetrical, set of benefits to what the United States traditionally offered. Importantly, U.S. relative power would have waned, thereby eroding its ability to furnish benefits to its own allies and partners. In an era of fragmentation and disorder, governments disillusioned with Washington’s inability or unwillingness to provide substantial aid could either adopt a neutral stance or turn to Beijing as a patron.
迄今为止，这些方法在中国的影响力和控制力方面最多只能获得少量的回报。民意调查显示，中国为赢得国际支持所做的努力总体上是失败的，尤其是在西方发达国家。学者们通过指出中国吸引力的持久局限性来否定中国国际力量的可能性。但中国影响力的一些局限性可以解释为，与美国相比，中国仍然是一个较弱的国家。中国也许能向各国提供相当多的经济援助，但它不能像美国那样凭借其广泛的伙伴关系网络提供外交和军事援助，而这正是美国作为现任全球领袖的主要好处之一。只要美国的地位看起来是安全的，世界各国就有强烈的动机倾向于美国而不是中国的力量。
在我们的设想中，这种情况会发生很大变化，因为中国已接近全球霸主地位。在我们的假设中，一带一路沿线国家目前正在进行的合作将变得更加富有成效，从而使中国在伙伴国的基础设施、制造业和技术发展以及外交和政治活动中的存在更加实质性和持久性。事实上，在我们的设想中，合作的水平将提高到这样的程度，即许多国家将变得依赖中国，这将标志着它们从拥有拒绝中国要求的自主权的 "伙伴国 "过渡到不太能拒绝同样要求的 "客户"。
一个更成功、更富有的中国将更有能力为其客户提供更广泛的利益，而且它在政治和军事上更有能力提供与美国传统上提供的利益相竞争（尽管不一定对称）的利益。重要的是，美国的相对实力会减弱，从而削弱其向自己的盟友和伙伴提供利益的能力。在一个四分五裂和无序的时代，对华盛顿无力或不愿提供实质性援助感到失望的政府，要么采取中立立场，要么转向北京作为主顾。
Even so, it is possible that in our scenario China does not achieve the level of international support enjoyed by the United States. Regarding countries on its periphery, China probably would not even exercise the type of tight control that Moscow held over the Eastern bloc. Chinese informal control could thus be considerably weaker than that seen in the other cases, with clients experiencing a higher degree of autonomy. One way China could mitigate the weaknesses of its control might be to generally support illiberal or authoritarian regimes that could suppress any popular discontent with pro-Chinese policies. Beijing might find this approach appealing as well due to its own political preferences. In short, Beijing in such a hypothetical future would rely primarily on informal control during its period of hegemony and as its primacy declined (see Table 3.3).
即便如此，在我们的设想中，中国有可能没有达到美国享有的国际支持水平。对于中国的周边国家，中国甚至可能不会像莫斯科对东方集团那样进行严格控制。因此，中国的非正式控制可能比其他情况下的控制要弱得多，客户有更高程度的自主权。中国缓解其控制力弱点的方法之一可能是普遍支持不自由或独裁的政权，这些政权可以压制民众对亲中国政策的不满情绪。由于自身的政治偏好，北京可能也会觉得这种方式很有吸引力。简而言之，在这样一个假设的未来，北京在其霸权时期以及随着其首要地位的下降，将主要依靠非正式控制（见表3.3）。
TABLE 3.3
Methods of Control of Leading Great Powers
领袖大国的控制方法（苏联、中国仅仅接近首要地位——译者注）
Leading Great
Control During
Power
Ascendance
Control During Primacy
Control During Decline
领袖大国
上升期的控制方式
首要地位期间控制方式
衰退期的控制方式
United Kingdom
Formal and informal
Formal and informal
Formal and informal
英国
正式与非正式
正式与非正式
正式与非正式
United States
Formal and informal
Informal
Informal
美国
正式与非正式
非正式
非正式
Soviet Union
Formal and informal
Informal
Informal
苏联
正式与非正式
非正式
非正式
China
Informal
Informal?
Informal?
中国
非正式
非正式
非正式？
Military Reach and Strength
军事势力范围
In this section we briefly evaluate the structure of military power for the countries in our sample. In particular, we are interested in the ability of each country to employ its military force to uphold its international influence and leadership. A robust military capable of power pro-jection is essential for protecting vital shipping lanes, defending clients, and deterring attacks against overseas national interests. To assess a country’s ability to project power abroad, we will examine the ability of a country to protect vital shipping lanes through naval power and the ability to fight threats to national interests abroad (see Table 3.4).
在这一节中，我们简要评估了样本中国家的军事力量结构。特别是我们对每个国家运用军事力量来维护其国际影响力和领导力的能力感兴趣。一支能够投射力量的强大军队对于保护重要航道、保卫客户和阻止对海外国家利益的攻击至关重要。为了评估一个国家向海外投射力量的能力，我们将考察一个国家通过海军力量保护重要航道的能力以及对抗海外国家利益威胁的能力（见表3.4）
TABLE 3.4
The Assessed Military Power of Leading Great Powers
领袖大国军事实力评估
Naval Primacy (over 50 Percent
Ability to Sustain Major Combat
Leading Great Power
Global Share)?
Operations on Another Continent?
领袖大国
海军在首要时期地位（超过50％的全球份额）
有能力在另一个大陆维持主要的战斗行动吗？
United Kingdom
Yes
Yes
英国
是
是
United States
Yes
Yes
美国
是
是
Soviet Union
No
No
苏联
否
否
China
Doubtful
Possible
中国
不确定
可能的
In terms of naval power, we are interested in a country’s strength relative to rival nations. One way to measure this is to consider its share of major naval combatants during the period of primacy. If the share of a single country is over 50 percent of the global total, then the country may be said to have a globally predominant navy. By this standard, the United King-dom had a globally predominant navy during the height of its primacy, from around 1820 through the late 1860s. The U.S. share of global power surpassed 50 percent from the end of World War II through the 1990s. The Soviet Union, by contrast, never achieved naval predominance. Reflecting its fundamental orientation as a Eurasian land power with little need to protect global shipping lanes, the Soviet military consisted primarily of a vast ground force, augmented by a modest navy that focused principally on submarine missions to deter the West and a surface fleet that sailed occasionally to Moscow’s clients in the developing world.
China appears poised to develop in a direction somewhere between the Western and Soviet examples. Unlike the Soviets, China’s prosperity is much more dependent on access to the global economy; accordingly, Beijing has shown a much stronger interest in developing a robust navy. The PLA Navy has undergone a dramatic expansion in past decades, and since at least 2020 it has surpassed the U.S. Navy to become the largest navy in the world in terms
of the number of major naval vessels. Similar to the UK and U.S. precedents, the PLA Navy is building ships for long distance, oceangoing voyages, including aircraft carriers, cruis-ers, and replenishment vessels. However, it is unclear if China can achieve a level of naval predominance experienced by its Western predecessors. China faces stiff competition from the U.S. Navy, as well as the substantial navies of India and Japan. Even decades from now, it seems doubtful that China will have achieved global predominance on the scale experienced by the United Kingdom and the United States.
在海军力量方面，我们感兴趣的是某个国家相对于敌手国家的实力。衡量的方法是考虑其海军力量占全球的份额。如果某个国家份额超过了全球总数50%，那么可以说这个国家拥有全球占主导地位海军。根据此标准，英国在其最重要的时期，即从1820年左右到19世纪60年代末，拥有全球占主导地位海军。从二战结束到20世纪90年代，美国在全球力量份额超过50%。相比之下，苏联从未实现过海军全球主导地位。
作为欧亚大陆大国（地大物博、具有自给自足的各种自然资源丰富——译者注），没有值得保护的全球运输航道。所以，苏联军队主要由庞大的地面部队组成（脑补上个世纪六十年代可能扑来的苏军装甲洪流、曾经多么地令我军忌惮——译者注），再加上一支规模适当的海军——主要通过潜艇遂行威慑西方之使命，还有一支偶尔为莫斯科在发展中国家的客户提供服务的水面舰队。
中国似乎正朝着西方和苏联先例之间的某个方向发展。与苏联不同，中国的繁荣更多地依赖于进入全球经济；因此，北京对发展一支强大的海军表现出强烈兴趣。解放军海军在过去十年里经历了一次戏剧性地扩张（指我军下饺子般地下水驱逐舰等各种舰船——译者注），从2020年开始，就主要海军舰艇的数量而言，它已经超越了美国海军，成为世界上最大的海军。与英国和美国的先例类似，解放军海军正在建造用于长途、远洋航行的船只，包括航空母舰、巡洋舰和补给船。然而，目前尚不清楚中国是否能够达到其西方前辈所经历的海军优势水平。因为中国依然面对来自美国海军地激烈竞争，以及印度和日本的大量舰船之PK。为此，从现在起的十年内，中国似乎将在英国和美国所经历的规模上实现全球主导地位，这确实令人难以相信。
For leading great powers that seek to exert influence on military affairs around the world, possession of a powerful navy is a necessary, but insufficient, precondition. A global leader must also be able to deploy and sustain major combat forces in another continent for weeks, months, or longer. Both the United Kingdom and the United States demonstrated such a capability, with the former fielding expeditionary forces fighting wars as far away as Burma, China, and South Africa in the nineteenth century. The United States not only deployed vast armies to both the European and Pacific theaters in World War II but also fought major wars in Korea and Vietnam during the Cold War. The Soviet Union, by contrast, did not dem-onstrate the capability to wage major combat operations on another continent. After World War II, the Soviet military supported client states with military advisers in Africa and other developing countries, and it projected major combat forces into neighboring countries, as it did in the Soviet-Afghan War. However, Moscow did not fight any major wars on other conti-nents. China appears poised to evolve into a force somewhere between the Western examples and that of the Soviet Union.
China has not fought a war beyond its periphery and currently lacks the capability to maintain major combat operations on another continent. But it has built its first overseas military base, in Djibouti, and it is significantly increasing its expe- ditionary capabilities. In addition to the growing naval fleet, it is expanding the PLA Navy Marine Corps to 100,000 personnel and is adding large transport aircraft. Chinese political and military thinkers have also expressed a clearer intent to field military forces abroad to protect the country’s growing array of interests when compared with what the Soviets could do. Yet even with the expanded capability, China will likely continue to field a far smaller expeditionary force than the United States possesses today, owing to a lack of allies, tighten-ing budget constraints, and other factors.
In terms of military might, China’s potential evolution as a leading power suggests a tra-jectory between its Western precedents and that of the Soviet Union. China’s navy and power projection capability will very likely far surpass that of the Soviet Union but will likely fall short of what the United States and even the United Kingdom achieved at the height of their respect eras of primacy. Even so, the PLA’s anticipated global reach and expanded capabilities open possibilities for military operations beyond the reach of Soviet commanders.
对于寻求主导全球军事的领袖大国来说，拥有强大的海军是必要但不充分的前提条件。全球领袖还必须能够在另一个大陆部署和维持主要作战部队数周、数月或更长时间。英国和美国都展示了这种能力，前者在十九世纪派遣远征军在遥远的缅甸、中国和南非作战。在第二次世界大战中，美国不仅在欧洲和太平洋战区部署了庞大的军队，而且在冷战期间还在朝鲜和越南打了几场大战。相比之下，苏联并没有展示出在另一个大陆上发动大规模战斗的能力。第二次世界大战后，苏联军队向非洲和其他发展中国家的附庸国提供军事顾问支持，并把主要作战力量投入邻国，就像在苏联——阿富汗战争中所做的那样。然而，莫斯科没有在其他大陆上打过大仗。而中国似乎准备演变成一支介于西方和苏联之间的力量。
中国没有在周边之外打过仗，目前也缺乏在另一个大陆维持主要作战行动的能力。但是它已经在吉布提建立了第一个海外军事基地，并且显著提高了它的远征能力。除了不断增长的海军舰队，它还将PLA海军陆战队扩充至十万人，并增加大型运输机。与苏联相比，中国的政治和军事思想家也表达了更明确的意图，即将军事力量部署到海外，以保护该国日益增长的利益。然而，即使能力有所增强，由于缺乏盟友、紧缩的预算约束和其他因素，中国可能会继续部署比美国今天拥有的小得多的远征军。
就军事实力而言，中国作为主导力量的潜在演变表明了其西方先例和苏联先例之间的一种推测。中国的海军和力量投射能力很可能远远超过苏联——但很可能达不到美国甚至英国在其鼎盛时期所取得的成就。即便如此，解放军预期的全球影响力和扩张的能力为苏联指挥官无法企及的军事行动提供了可能性。
Patterns in Conflict
冲突模式
In this section we analyze the types of conflict engaged in by leading great powers and how these have unfolded in their respective histories. We group the types of conflict by their char-acteristics and then explore patterns of association between types of conflict and the phases of ascent, primacy, and decline for the sample countries. In terms of the types of conflict, international relations scholars have expended consid-erable effort analyzing major wars between great powers. Scholars have noted, for example, that the ample resources of these states permit them to wage wars of unusually destructive magnitude. These wars are of high interest, in part because their outcomes can have a pro-found impact on the direction of history. Napoleon Bonaparte’s defeat at Waterloo by Brit-ain and its allies decisively closed the chapter on Europe’s domination by France. Similarly, the immense destruction of World War II shattered fascist power and opened the way for U.S. international leadership.
But although great powers have faced formidable threats in their peer rivals, they also frequently coped with a broad range of other threats. The militaries of these leading great powers often undertook operations against insurgencies or against other minor powers. In some cases, conflicts may have involved an overlapping array of threats, such as insurgencies
or a smaller country’s military backed by a rival great power. The leading great power may have supplied arms and equipment to an ally to fight a proxy war against the ally of a rival great power. Or the leading great power may have aided its ally in operations to crush insur-gencies and nonstate armed groups that were in turn backed by a rival great power.
在本节中，我们分析领袖大国卷入冲突的类型，以及这些冲突在各自历史中“扮演的角色“。我们将冲突类型特征进行分组，然后探讨冲突类型与样本国家的崛起、首要地位和衰退阶段之间的关联模式。就冲突的类型而言，国际关系学者在分析大国之间的主要战争方面花费了相当大的精力。例如，学者们已经注意到，这些国家的充足资源使他们能够发动破坏力异常巨大的战争。这些战争备受关注，部分原因是其结果会对历史的走向产生影响。拿破仑—波拿巴在滑铁卢被英国及其盟友击败，决定性地结束了法国统治欧洲的辉煌。同样，第二次世界大战的巨大破坏粉碎了法西斯势力，为美国的国际领导地位开辟了道路。
但是，尽管大国面临着同行对手的强大威胁，它们也经常应对其他广泛的威胁。这些领袖大国的军队经常针对叛乱或其他小国开展行动。在某些情况下，冲突可能涉及一系列重叠的威胁，如叛乱活动 或一个小国军队得到敌对大国的支持。领袖大国可能向盟友提供武器和设备，以便与敌对大国的盟友进行代理战争。或者，领袖大国可能协助其盟友开展行动，粉碎由敌对大国和非国家武装团体支持的叛乱行动。
For the purposes of our analysis, we will categorize military conflicts in three overarch-ing categories, based on key characteristics. The first, systemic wars, consists of wars between rival great powers for the purpose of determining leadership in a global or regional politi-cal system. Intensely studied by scholars, these tend to feature conventional war between rival great power militaries. However, as the example of World War II showed, such wars could involve the use of nuclear weapons. The fear of nuclear exchange permeated the Cold War struggle for primacy between the Soviet Union and the United States. The advent of cyberweapons and space -based weapons further raises the specter of devastating strategic attacks in the event of an all-out struggle for supremacy among contenders for global powers. Another characteristic of systemic wars is that they tend to be multilateral affairs, involving large coalitions against one another. In such conflicts, the phenomenon of “war joining,” in which countries join one coalition or the other, is common. Countries war join partly in hopes of reaping rewards from supporting the victorious side. The outcome tends to result in a significant realignment of international affairs. Examples include the Napoleonic Wars and World Wars I and II.
A second category is wars of territorial conquest. These are wars over issues of territorial control. Scholars who have examined past wars have emphasized the salience of territorial disputes as a key driver of interstate conflict. These tend to be bilateral affairs, and the main outcome is the resolution of a territorial dispute. In most cases, these wars involve conven-tional forces on both sides, though weaker, less developed adversaries may resort to irregular war to combat imperial invaders. Examples include British wars to acquire colonies in Africa and South Asia, the Mexican-American War, and the Spanish-American War.
The third category is military interventions. A catchall category, this captures the myriad small-scale military crises, proxy conflicts, clashes, and confrontations that permeate the histories of great powers and frequently involve client states or those of rival great powers. They use military forces and the threat of violence but are not necessarily fatal events. These operations tend to be smaller than those in the other two categories, though not always, as in the case of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Relevant operations include interventions, raids, and military support to a client’s defensive or offensive operations. The main aim of these international incidents, crises, and conflicts is to ensure the security of a client and uphold the credibility of the leading great power as an ally. Examples include the 1898 Fashoda incident in East Africa, where Britain prevailed over French efforts at domination, U.S. military interven-tions in Latin America, the U.S. war in Vietnam, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
出于分析的目的，我们根据关键特点，把军事冲突分为三个总体的类别。
第一类，系统性战争，包括敌对大国之间的战争，目的是决定全球或区域政治体系中的领导地位。学者们对这些战争进行了深入研究，它们往往以敌对大国军队之间的常规战争为特征。然而，正如第二次世界大战的例子所示，这种战争可能涉及核武器的使用。对核战争的恐惧贯穿于苏联和美国之间争夺首要地位的冷战中。网络武器和天基武器的出现，进一步提高了全球大国竞争者之间全面争夺霸权的情况下毁灭性战略攻击的可能性。系统性战争的另一个特点是，它们往往是多边事务，涉及大型联盟之间的对抗。在这种冲突中，"加入战争 "的现象很常见，即各国加入一个或另一个联盟。各国加入战争的部分原因是希望通过支持胜利的一方获得回报。其结果往往会导致国际事务的重大调整。这方面的例子包括拿破仑战争以及第一次和第二次世界大战。
第二类是领土征服的战争。这类战争是围绕着领土控制问题而进行的战争。战争史学者强调，领土争端是国家间冲突的关键驱动因素。但一个巴掌拍不响，在大多数情况下，这些战争涉及到双方的军队。尽管较弱的、欠发达的对手可能会诉诸非正规战争来打击帝国主义入侵者。这方面的例子包括英国在非洲和南亚获取殖民地的战争、美墨战争和美西战争。
第三类是军事干预。这是一个总括性的类别，它涵盖了无数小规模的军事危机、代理冲突、冲突和对抗，它们贯穿了大国的历史，并经常涉及客户国或敌对大国的客户国。它们使用军事力量和暴力威胁，但不一定是致命的事件。这些行动往往比其他两类行动规模要小，尽管并不总是如此，如苏联入侵阿富汗的情况。相关行动包括干预、突袭和对客户的防御性或进攻性行动的军事支持。这些国际事件、危机和冲突的主要目的是确保客户的安全，维护领袖大国作为盟友的信誉。这方面的例子包括1898年东非的法绍达事件——英国在该事件中战胜了法国的统治努力，美国在拉丁美洲的军事干预，美国在越南的战争，以及苏联对捷克斯洛伐克的入侵。
Unlike the outcomes of systemic wars, the outcomes of these wars do not by themselves deci-sively change the overall structure of international power. And unlike the wars of territorial acquisition, these incidents, crises, and conflicts do not have as a primary objective the annexa-tion of land; accordingly, their conclusion does not generally result in changes to the leading great power’s boundaries, although it could result in the loss or gain of territory for client states.
A brief consideration of history shows that each of the great powers engaged in many of these types of operations. The United Kingdom, for example, fought major systemic wars against rivals such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States. The Anglo-Dutch wars spanned the 1600s and 1700s and resulted in the United Kingdom gaining mas-tery of the ocean over its mercantile rivals. France and the United Kingdom clashed repeat-edly throughout the 1700s and early 1800s, with conflict spanning the oceans, colonies in the Americas, and on the European continent. The United Kingdom also fought off a major challenge to its leading position in the international system by the Germans in World Wars I and II, though the result was such a weakening of its position that London proved inca-pable of warding off the United States as its successor. The United Kingdom also fought wars to expand its territorial (colonial) holdings in Africa, the Americas, Asia, and elsewhere. It engaged in many smaller-scale military interventions as well. For example, British troops helped the client state Malaysia suppress communist insurgents in the 1950s. The United King-dom also became involved in numerous standoffs, militarized crises, and other lesser military incidents with either rival great powers or their allies, as it did in the Suez Crisis in the 1950s.
与系统性战争的结果不同，这些战争的结果本身不会决定性地改变国际权力的整体结构。而且，与获取领土的战争不同，这些事件、危机和冲突并不以吞并土地为主要目标；因此，它们的结束一般不会导致领袖大国边界的改变，尽管它可能导致客户国的领土损失或获得。
对历史的简单思考表明，每个大国都参与了许多这类行动。例如，英国曾与法国、德国、荷兰和美国等对手进行过重大的系统性战争。英荷战争跨越了16世纪和17世纪，导致英国获得了对其商业对手的大规模海洋贸易。法国和英国在整个18世纪和19世纪初反复发生冲突，冲突跨越海洋、美洲殖民地和欧洲大陆。在第一次和第二次世界大战中，英国还击退了德国对其在国际体系中领导地位的重大挑战，尽管其结果是地位被削弱，以至于伦敦被证明没有能力抵御美国作为其继承者。英国通过战争扩大其在非洲、美洲、亚洲和其他地方的领土（殖民）占有率。它还参与了许多小规模的军事干预。例如，英国军队在20世纪50年代帮助客户国马来西亚镇压共产主义叛乱分子。联合王国还参与了许多对峙、军事化危机，以及与敌对大国或其盟国之间的其它较小规模的军事事件，如1950年代的苏伊士运河危机。
The United States similarly fought major wars with rival great powers in the Spanish-American War, and in World Wars I and II. Washington’s repeated clashes with the United Kingdom in the 1800s underscored the often tense nature of the relationship between a rising and status quo leading power. After 1945, the United States faced the Soviet Union as a great power adversary. Although direct war between the two was avoided, they did fight conflicts against each other’s allies in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet-Afghan War. Both sides also struggled against each other through military interventions and proxy wars in such developing countries as Angola, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. The two also faced each other directly in different militarized crises and stand offs, as happened with the Berlin airlift crisis, the Cuban missile crisis, and other incidents.
As these examples illustrate, leading great powers have traditionally carried out a broad range of military operations, from large-scale conventional war to unconventional war, coun-terinsurgency, and proxy wars.
美国也同样在美西战争以及第一次和第二次世界大战中与敌对大国进行了重大战争。华盛顿在19世纪与伦敦的多次冲突，说明崛起的大国与现实领袖大国之间的关系往往是紧张的。1945年后，美国作为大国对手面对苏联。虽然两者之间的直接战争被避免了，但它们确实在朝鲜战争、越南战争和苏联——阿富汗战争中与对方的盟友发生了冲突。双方还通过在安哥拉、萨尔瓦多和尼加拉瓜等发展中国家的军事干预和代理相互斗争。双方还在不同的军事化危机和对峙中直面对方，如发生在柏林空运危机、古巴导弹危机和其他事件等。
正如这些例子所表明的，领袖大国传统上进行了广泛的军事行动，从大规模常规战争到非常规战争、暴动叛乱和代理战争。
However, scholars have noted that leading great powers have shown a proclivity to engage in certain types of conflict at different points in the relative rise and decline of their powers, a point we examine more closely below.
Using this basic typology of systemic war, war of territorial conquest, and military inter-ventions, we can characterize the types of conflict that leading great powers appear most likely to engage in during their respective phases of ascent, primacy, and decline. Scholars of the power transition, hegemonic stability, and long cycle schools of thought agree that the risk of systemic war to decide international leadership is most likely to happen during periods of transition. Thus, the periods of ascent or decline are likely to feature a higher likelihood of systemic war. Scholars of conflict over territorial issues also have concluded that the rela-tive age of a state affects the propensity for conflict. Newly independent and younger states generally are more prone to fighting over territory than older, mature states. Among our sample countries, wars of territorial conquest occurred most frequently during the periods of “ascent.” The United Kingdom’s ascent occurred during an age of European imperialism, and wars were sometimes waged in part to gain valuable colonial possessions. It gained terri-tory in the Americas, for example, when it defeated France in the French and Indian War. The United Kingdom also regarded territory not claimed by a rival Western industrialized state as “unrecognized” and thus occasionally seized territories after it defeated Eastern militar-ies, as did other European imperialists. For example, the United Kingdom annexed Mysore after fighting several wars in the 1700s. In the mid-1800s and afterward, the United Kingdom added to its territorial holdings, but rarely as a direct result of military conquest.
然而，学者们注意到，领袖大国在其权力相对兴衰的不同阶段表现出参与某些类型冲突的倾向性，这一点我们将在下面更加仔细地研究。
通过研究系统性战争、领土征服战争和军事干预的基本类型，我们可以发现领袖大国在各自地崛起、首要地位和衰落阶段似乎最有可能参与的冲突类型。研究“权力过渡、霸权稳定和长周期学派”的学者们一致认为，决定国际领导地位的系统性战争风险最有可能发生在过渡时期。因此，上升期或下降期是系统性战争的高发期。研究领土问题冲突的学者们还认为，国家的相关年纪会影响冲突的倾向性。新独立的和年轻的国家通常比年长的、成熟的国家更容易为领土而战。在我们的样本国家中，领土征服战争在 "崛起 "时期发生得最为频繁。英国的崛起发生在欧洲帝国主义时代，有时发动战争的部分原因是为了获得宝贵的殖民地资产。例如，英国在法印战争中击败法国后，获得了美洲的领土。联合王国还将没有被西方工业化国家争夺的领土视为 "未被承认 "的领土，因此在打败东方国家的军队后，偶尔会夺取领土，其他欧洲帝国主义者也是如此。例如，英国在17世纪打了几场战争后吞并了迈索尔。在18世纪中期和之后，联合王国增加了其领土占有量，但很少是军事征服的直接结果。
During periods of primacy and decline, the character of conflict tends to change toward conflicts involving client states and various militarized confrontations. As theorized by hege-monic stability theorists, leading great powers carry out these types of more limited military interventions as part of a sort of “system maintenance” to uphold the current order. Rivalries with other great powers may continue, but do not tend to escalate to the point of major war. During the U.S. period of primacy, for example, the nation fought significant wars in Korea and Vietnam, but these were military interventions with client states that only indirectly involved the Soviet Union. The disappointing outcomes for the United States did not funda-mentally alter the trajectory of U.S. primacy during those years.
In periods of decline, military interventions may be carried out to shore up faltering influ-ence and stave off challenges from rising powers. Periods of decline may also feature systemic wars, as happened to the United Kingdom. Although it prevailed against its main challenger, Germany, in World Wars I and II, the strain of war broke British power, leaving London too weak to prev leader, but it is worth noting that it undertook one of its largest military interventions—the invasion of Afghanistan—in its last years as a waning power.
在霸主地位和衰落时期，冲突的特点往往会向涉及客户国和各种军事化对抗的冲突转变。正如霸权主义稳定理论家所认为的那样，领袖大国进行这类较为有限的军事干预，是维护当前秩序之 "系统维护 "的一部分。与其他大国的竞争可能会继续下去，但往往不会升级到大规模战争的程度。例如，在美国占据主导地位期间，美国在朝鲜和越南进行了重大战争，但这些都是对客户国家的军事干预，只是间接涉及到苏联。对美国来说，令人失望的结果是并没有从根本上改变这些年美国首要地位的发展轨迹。
在衰落时期，可能会进行军事干预，以巩固摇摇欲坠的影响力，抵御来自崛起大国的挑战。衰退期也可能出现系统性的战争，就像发生在英国身上的那样。尽管英国在第一次和第二次世界大战中战胜了其主要挑战者德国，但战争的压力打破了英国的力量，使伦敦变得太弱，无法继续成为领导者，但值得注意的是，英国在其作为一个衰落的大国的最后几年，进行了最大的军事干预——入侵阿富汗。
This overview of the patterns in conflict experienced by past leading great powers car-ries some implications for our analysis of China’s potential trajectory. If we date the start of China’s ascent to 1979, then it has generally refrained from war. The exceptions have been minor skirmishes with Vietnam that resulted in the acquisition of territory in the early 1980s—most notably that of Johnson Reef in 1988. China also faces the same reality regard-ing the lack of easily accessed unclaimed territory as that confronted by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the post–World War II order. The opprobrium of military conquest has made wars of territorial acquisition as unappealing to China as it may have been to the other leading great powers in recent years.
Yet that does not mean China has refrained from the pattern of expanding its territorial holdings as it has ascended in power. It may be the case that China has found a less risky, less politically objectionable approach in turning disputed islands and regions into Chinese-administered and firmly controlled terri-tory, as it has done with the South China Sea. Even if these examples are counted, China has carried out a far lower level of war for territorial gain than the other leading great powers in our sample. Of course, it is possible that the pattern could change and that China could resort to military violence to resolve Taiwan’s status or its differences with neighbors over disputed land borders and maritime regions. The U.S. government’s highlighting of regional flash points involving China is consistent with the logic of territory-related conflict as most likely during the period of China’s ascent. The flash points of the East and South China Seas, the Indian border, and Taiwan similarly all imply that a key political objective for Beijing in these situations is to increase the country’s territorial holding at the expense of a rival claimant.
对过去领袖大国所经历的冲突模式之概述，对我们分析中国潜在发展轨迹有一些借鉴。如果我们把中国崛起的时间定在1979年，那么中国一般都会避免战争。例外的情况是与越南的小规模冲突，这些冲突导致中国在80年代初获得了领土——最明显的是1988年的约翰逊礁（西方国家称呼，即中国赤瓜礁——译者注）。中国也面临着与苏联、英国和美国在二战后所面临的同样的现实，即缺乏容易进入的无主领土。军事征服的恶名使中国对领土获取的战争不感兴趣，就像近年来对其他领袖大国一样。
然而，这并不意味着中国在提升实力的过程中避免了扩大领土占有的模式。中国可能找到了一种风险较小、政治上不那么令人反感的方法，即把有争议的岛屿和地区变成由中国管理和牢牢控制的领土，正如它在南海所做的那样。即使把这些例子计算在内，中国为领土利益而进行的战争也远远低于我们样本中的其他领袖大国。当然，这种模式有可能发生变化，中国有可能诉诸军事暴力来解决台湾的地位问题或与邻国在有争议的陆地边界和海洋地区的分歧。美国政府对涉及中国的地区热点的强调，与中国崛起时期最可能发生的与领土有关的冲突的逻辑是一致的。中国东海和南海、印度边境和台湾等热点地区同样意味着中国政府在这些情况下的关键政治目标是以牺牲对手的权利主张为代价来增加国家领土占有（作者笼统把中国统一台湾跟领土问题混淆一起、显然犯了概念不清的错误——译者注）。
The precedent of systemic war in the ascent phase of past leading great powers suggests this possibility cannot be ruled out either. Currently, most Western experts assess the risk of interstate war as very low, despite the dramatic increase in U.S.-China tensions. Chinese scholars similarly share the view that the U.S.-China competition has a very low probability of escalating to war. However, international relations scholars continue to warn of the risks of a “power transition war” and debate the possibility of a Thucydides Trap in which rising and status quo powers fight to resolve the issue of systemic leadership.
Wars for territorial expansion or to resolve issues of systemic leadership remain unlikely, albeit highly dangerous, scenarios. The review of preceding leading great powers has shown, however, that a far more likely use of Chinese military power in coming years may be those related to military interventions. All the countries in our sample relied extensively on mili-tary interventions during their respective periods of primacy and decline. This is especially the case for powerful countries that rely more on informal methods of control in the postwar era. China, like the Soviet Union, also opposes formal methods of control for political reasons and thus likewise has a strong incentive to rely on smaller-scale military operations to exer-cise influence and leadership (see Table 3.6).
历史领袖大国在上升阶段发生系统性战争先例表明，这种可能性也不能被排除。目前，尽管美中之间的紧张关系急剧增加，但大多数西方专家评估国家间战争的风险非常低。中国学者也同样认为，美中竞争升级为战争的概率非常低。然而，国际关系学者继续对 "权力过渡战争 "的风险提出警告，并对 "修昔底德陷阱 "的可能性进行辩论：即崛起的大国和守成的大国为解决系统性领导权问题而斗争。
为扩张领土或解决系统性领导问题而进行的战争，尽管非常危险，但仍是不大可能发生的情况。然而，对先前领袖大国的回顾表明，在未来几年里，中国军事力量的使用更可能是与军事干预有关的。在我们的样本中，所有国家在其各自的主要地位和衰退时期都广泛依赖军事干预。对于那些在战后更依赖非正式控制方法的强大国家来说，情况尤其如此。中国和苏联一样，出于政治原因也反对正式的控制方法，因此也同样有强烈的动机依靠较小规模的军事行动来发挥影响力和领导力。
Summary
摘要
The patterns of past leading great powers carry several implications for China. First, the analysis suggests that China remains in the period of its ascent as a great power. The nature of potential military conflicts may change and evolve as the country grows more powerful, but for the near term, past precedent suggests that the most plausible Chinese conflict sce-narios consist of those related to territorial acquisition. Not surprisingly, most analysts regard war to subjugate Taiwan as among the most likely flash points for U.S.-China conflict for the foreseeable future. But in addition, in 2020, Chinese troops fought a series of bloody brawls on the Indian border, which suggests that the unresolved status of that border remains a potent flash point. Other near-term flash points involve sovereignty and territorial disputes, such as those related to the East and South China Seas. However, the pattern established by the other examples suggests that the risks of systemic war remain real throughout the period of China’s ascent. As in the case of the rising powers Germany and Japan in the twentieth century, the pursuit of territorial expansion may become inseparable from broader issues of international systemic leadership. These precedents suggest a high potential for any conflict related to Chinese-claimed territory to escalate into a broader systemic war principally due to the risk that the United States might intervene.
This chapter has underscored the importance of how the method of control exercised by a power influences the range of military operations it might undertake. China’s preference for informal and indirect methods of control over formal annexation or colonization provides a strong incentive for Beijing to carry out a broad range of military interventions to bolster clients, control threats, enhance China’s influence and status, and possibly downgrade rivals, including the United States. Chinese success in exercising informal control could result in reduced U.S. military access in the Indo-Pacific and other areas of strategic value to Beijing, which, in turn, would further undermine U.S. credibility and ability to respond to Chinese military action (see Table 3.7).
过去领袖大国的模式对中国有几个方面的影响。首先，分析表明，中国仍处于上升为大国的时期。随着中国国力的增强，潜在军事冲突的性质可能会发生变化，但就近期而言，过去的先例表明，中国最合理的冲突情景是与获取领土有关的冲突。毫不奇怪，大多数分析家认为征服台湾的战争是在可预见的未来美中冲突最可能的爆发点之一（这里作者把台湾问题纳入领土争端是原则性错误——译者注）。但除此之外，2020年，中国军队在印度边境发生了一系列血腥争斗（作者此处纯粹歪曲事实，不是“中国军队在印度边境发生了一系列血腥争斗”而是中印（两国）边界发生一系列血腥争斗——译者注），这表明（中印）边境的未解决地位仍然是一个强有力的爆发点。其他近期爆发点涉及主权和领土争端，如与东海和南海有关的争端。然而，其他例子所建立的模式表明，在中国崛起的整个过程中，系统性战争的风险仍然存在。正如二十世纪崛起的大国德国和日本一样，对领土扩张的追求可能与更广泛的国际系统性领导问题密不可分。这些先例表明，主要由于美国可能进行干预的风险，任何与中国声称的领土有关的冲突都很有可能升级为一场更广泛的系统性战争。
本章强调了国家控制方法如何影响可能采取的军事行动范围的重要性。相对于正式的吞并或殖民，中国更倾向于采用非正式和间接的控制方法，这就有力地刺激了中国进行广泛的军事干预，以支持客户，控制威胁，提高中国的影响力和地位，并可能降低包括美国在内的对手的地位。中国在行使非正式控制方面的成功可能会导致美国在印度洋——太平洋地区和其他对中国政府有战略价值的地区的军事通道减少，这反过来又会进一步削弱美国对中国军事行动的可信度和应对能力（见表3.7）
TABLE 3.7
Aspects of Potential Global Primacy: Implications for Possible U.S.-China Conflict
准全球首要之方方面面：假设美中潜在冲突之要素
Aspect of Potential
Implications for Possible U.S.-China Conflict
Global Leadership
假设美中潜在冲突之要素
准全球首要之方方面面
Geographic foundation
China’s focus on Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East as the geographic foundation for international leadership raises
地理基础环境
the possibility of conflict with the United States in those areas.
中国把非洲、亚洲、拉丁美洲和中东作为国际领导地位的地理基础，这就增大了在这些地区与美国发生冲突的可能性。
Methods of control
China’s reliance on informal methods to control clients suggests that U.S.-China conflict abroad could involve some form of proxy
控制的方法
conflict and/or PLA military interventions.
中国依靠非正式的方法来控制客户国，这表明美中在海外的冲突可能涉及某种形式的代理冲突或解放军的军事干预。
Military power
China may have the capability for limited power projection beyond Asia, and its naval advantage could grow if more
军事力量
countries become Chinese clients.
中国可能有能力将有限的力量投射到亚洲以外的地区，如果有更多的国家成为中国的客户，那么中国海军会越来越壮大。
Patterns in conflict
Through 2040, military interventions seem more plausible, but wars to secure territory and systemic wars could also be possible.
冲突中的模式
到2040年，军事干预似乎更有可能，但确保领土的战争和系统性战争也可能发生。
The geographic foundations of leading great powers merit emphasis as well. More clearly than the Soviet Union ever attempted, China has telegraphed its intention to become the predominant power across a broad swath of the world’s geography. We should anticipate that Chinese military forces will concentrate on the same regions that hold the country’s most vital economic and political interests—namely, Africa, Asia, parts of Latin America, and the Middle East. These are also likely to be the regions most prone to experiencing Chinese mili-tary interventions. To the extent that the United States and its allies and partners operate in the same areas, the risks of conflict in conditions of hostile rivalry could grow.
领袖大国的地理基础也值得重视。比起苏联的尝试，中国更清楚地表达了它想成为世界上广泛地理区域主导力量的意图。我们应该预计到，中国军事力量将集中在那些拥有中国最重要经济和政治利益地区，即非洲、亚洲、拉丁美洲部分地区和中东。这些地区也可能是最容易遭受中国军事干预的地区。如果美国及其盟友和伙伴在这些地区开展活动，在敌对状态下发生冲突的风险就会增加。
As in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union, both China and the United States could remain rivals for decades, with the prospect for more limited conflict waxing and waning over time. Should China achieve a position of primacy, the nature of conflicts it could engage in might differ from those related to territory. It might instead follow the examples of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States in carrying out system-maintaining military interventions to uphold its authority, maintain order, and con-trol threats along “BRI”routes. To the extent that the United States and its allies and partners oppose Beijing’s interests and intent along those routes, the risk grows of some sort of mili-tary intervention or proxy conflict involving Chinese and possibly U.S. military forces.
如同美国和苏联的情况一样，中国和美国都可能在几十年内保持竞争关系，随着时间的推移，有限冲突的前景会逐渐减弱。如果中国取得首要地位，它可能参与的冲突性质也许不同于跟领土有关的冲突。中国可能会效仿苏联、英国和美国的做法，进行维持体系的军事干预，以维护其权威，维持秩序，并防范“一带一路”沿线的不测。如果美国及其盟友和伙伴“反对”中国在这些路线上的利益和意图，那么发生某种军事干预或代理冲突的风险就会增加，这可能会把中国甚至有可能美国的军事力量卷入进去。
