南德智库报告第七章翻译
兰德智库报告：大国战争的回归
——美中两国系统性冲突的情景
The Return of Great Power War
Scenarios of Systemic Conflict Between the United States and China
陶勇翻译
兰德智库报告：大国战争的回归-美中两国系统性冲突的情景
第七章美中高烈度系统性冲突情景
A High-Intensity U.S.-China Systemic Conflict Scenario
美中高烈度系统性冲突情景
In this chapter we explore a scenario of high-intensity systemic conflict between China and the United States. This scenario builds on the developments outlined in Chapter Six, as we judge that the most likely path to high-intensity war would be an escalation from low-intensity war. The principal difference in this scenario, of course, is that both sides have directed their militaries to directly engage each other. Leaders on both sides would struggle to contain the war from escalating to the point of devastating nuclear exchanges or cyberattacks on civilian infrastructure but would also face strong incentives to escalate the war in hopes of achieving a decisive victory. The risk of escalation would accordingly be extremely high. The conflict could extend to many parts of the world and include highly destructive attacks in outer space and cyberspace, and it could involve some level of nuclear weapon use.
在这章中，我们讨论发生在美中之间的高烈度系统性冲突情景，这是建立在本报告第六章概述发展的基础上做出的——我们判断，最有可能导致高烈度系统性战争的途径是从低烈度系统性冲突升级。当然，这种情况的主要区别在于，双方军队直接交战。两国领导人会努力遏制战争升级到毁灭性的核交火或对民用基础设施的网络攻击，但同样，让战争升级的强烈动机依然存在——以取得决定性的胜利。因此，战争升级的风险会非常高，这场冲突可能会蔓延到全球许多地方，甚至还包括外层空间和网络空间的高度破坏性攻击，并可能导致某种程度上动用核武器。
First, we flesh out key geopolitical assumptions to provide context for the national strate-gic and military directives in this scenario. We then describe what the national leadership’s directives to the military might look like in such a situation, paying particular attention to distinctive features of China’s approach to the extent that we can confidently project them. We then explain how the military might modify its mission, force development, and guid-ance on force employment to carry out a high-intensity war. With this material as context, we then sketch out a variety of conflict operation possibilities. These should be viewed as illus-trative examples based on the logic and assumptions of the scenario, not predictions.
首先，我们阐述了关键的地缘政治假设，为这一情景下的国家战略和军事指令提供背景。然后，我们描述了在这种情况下国家领导层对军队的指令可能是什么样子的，并在我们可以有把握预测的范围内特别关注中国方法的独特之处。然后，我们将解释军方在执行高强度战争时可能如何调整任务、部队发展和军力使用指南——以这些材料为背景，我们将勾勒出各种冲突行动的可能性——这些应被视为基于情景逻辑和假设的示例，而非预测。
Geopolitical Assumptions
地缘政治假设
The geopolitical context shares much in common with that described in Chapter Six. Both countries have entered a state of hostility after having designated each other as an “enemy” state. The onset of open hostilities would follow months or years of indirect, low-intensity conflict around the world in which each of the two nations regularly battled forces aligned with the other. Over time, self-imposed restraints to control escalation could loosen, lead-ing to more violent and shocking clashes and incidents that serve to harden opinion in both capitals.
本章地缘政治背景描述与第六章所述有许多共同之处。美中两国在互为 "敌国 "后进入对峙状态。在此之前，两国都曾在世界各地发生过数月或数年的间接、低强度冲突，并经常与对方的军队交战。随着时间的推移，控制冲突升级的自我约束可能会放松，从而导致更激烈、更令人震惊的冲突和事件，使两国政府的舆论立场更加强硬。
The established trend of U.S.-China rivalry overlapping with rivalry involving other coun-tries would probably continue or intensify. Countries eager to secure the benefits of patron- age from one great power could provoke their own clashes with enemies aligned with the rival great power. Moreover, efforts on the part of China and the United States to mobilize interna-tional support against each other could aggravate dynamics of regional and global polariza-tion, which could in turn raise the stakes of the conflict. The involvement of growing numbers of countries would disincentivize compromise in militarized crises, raising the likelihood of bloody outcomes and miscalculation. In such a volatile and unpredictable international situ-ation, the temptation to escalate to conventional attacks could prove difficult to resist. More-over, the spreading economic dislocation and persistence of chaotic and unaddressed security problems around the world would further strain the military resources of both countries. Decisionmakers in Beijing and Washington could lose patience with an indirect war of attri-tion and demand more aggressive measures to more rapidly bring the war to a conclusion.
中美竞争与其他国家竞争重叠的既定趋势可能会继续或加剧，而急于从某个大国获得赞助国利益的国家可能会挑起与敌对大国的冲突。此外，中国和美国动员国际社会支持对方的努力可能会加剧地区和全球两极分化的态势，这反过来又会增加冲突的风险。越来越多的国家参与进来，会抑制军事化危机中的妥协，增加血腥结果和误判的可能性。在这种动荡和不可预测的国际局势下，升级为常规攻击的诱惑可能难以抵挡。此外，经济失调的蔓延以及世界各地持续存在的混乱和悬而未决的安全问题将使两国的军事资源更加紧张。北京和华盛顿的决策者可能会对间接战争失去耐心，要求采取更激进的措施、更迅速地结束战争。
One major difference between the scenario outlined here and that in Chapter Six thus lies in the heightened sense of threat and urgency. Whereas in the low-intensity scenario both countries might have tried to balance the struggle to prevail with a desire to reap the benefits of maintaining trade and some level of cooperation, in this scenario the relations are uni-formly hostile and bitterly acrimonious. There is also a greater sense of urgency to the war effort, perhaps owing to the severe damage to the global economy and the disintegration of global order. In this scenario, each country accordingly regards the other as an enemy com-mitted to its destruction. This elevated threat perception justifies the willingness to engage in extensive conventional combat and to risk escalation in order to prevail. While both China and the United States may hope to avoid use of nuclear weapons, the imperative to prevail in a struggle for supremacy results in a fraying and uncertain ability to control escalation. More-over, the urgent desire to bring the war to a conclusion could lead decisionmakers in Beijing and Washington to authorize highly escalatory attacks in hopes of achieving decisive victory.
这里概述的情景和第六章中的情景之间的主要区别就在于威胁感和紧迫感增强了。而在低强度的场景中，两国可能都试图在争取优势的斗争与获得维持贸易和某种程度合作的好处之间达到平衡。在这种场景中，两国关系都是敌对和激烈的。或许是由于全球经济遭受的严重破坏和全球秩序的瓦解，这场战争也有了更大的紧迫感。在这种情况下，每个国家都相应地将对方视为注定要毁灭的敌人。这种更高的威胁感体现了参与广泛的常规战斗并冒着升级的风险以求取胜的意愿。虽然中国和美国都避免使用核武器，但在争夺霸权的斗争中获胜的必要性导致控制升级的能力减弱和不确定。此外，结束战争的迫切愿望可能导致北京和华盛顿的决策者授权高度升级的攻击，希望一劳永逸地取得决定性胜利。
China’s Wartime National Strategic Goals
中国战时国家战略目标
The onset of high-intensity war with the United States could drive China to dramatically reorder its national strategic goals. While still seeking in the long term to achieve the China Dream end state, Beijing would likely prioritize more pressing goals. This reprioritization would likely stem directly from the inconclusive results of low-intensity systemic war. For example, the decision to wage high-intensity war could arise from the desperate realization that China’s prosecution of a low-intensity war had failed. Alternatively, Chinese leaders could escalate the violence due to their belief that they have gained the upper hand and that conventional conflict could bring victory over the United States and end the chronic state of inconclusive low-intensity conflict. We will refrain from speculating on the precise path or specific drivers that shift the low-intensity war to a high-intensity one and simply instead suggest that the leadership has shifted to a high-intensity war after dissatisfaction with the progress of the low-intensity war. In shifting to a high-intensity war, Beijing will likely have adjusted its national strategy to prioritize national survival and defeat of the United States as a rival power (Table 7.1). With an elevated perception of threat and willingness to embrace extremely high risks, we assume Beijing will have increased its demands for victory. In part to justify the turn to potentially catastrophic major war, Beijing could refine its war aims to seek a severe downgrading in U.S. power. The end state would accept the continuation of the United States as a nation, but in so weakened a condition that it could not plausibly pose a threat to China’s ambitions for years or even decades. China could be willing to tolerate a far higher level of destruction and show a higher willingness to inflict violence in pursuit of such a desired end state. This might mean that it would seek a substantial degradation of U.S. warfighting capability and economic strength. At the same time, China would hope to limit the degree of damage and destruction to its own military and economic strength in hopes of reconstituting its national power after the war. In short, we suggest that the principal goal guiding the formulation and implementation of a high-intensity war would be to rapidly and decisively cripple U.S. power to such an extent that the United States would have little choice but to accept a position of subordination in a new Chinese-led order. Put more concisely, China would regard the war as a way to decisively resolve the issue of global leadership. Beijing might not start with that demand, and it might in fact begin a conventional war with more limited aims, but the struc-tural drivers underpinning U.S.-China rivalry would make it difficult to avoid eventually arriving at this conclusion.
和美国爆发高强度战争可能会促使中国大幅调整其国家战略目标。尽管仍在寻求实现中国梦的长远目标，但北京可能会优先考虑更紧迫的目标。这种重新优先化估计直接源于低强度系统性战争的不确定性结果。例如，发动高强度战争的决定可能源于绝望地意识到中国对低强度战争的把控业已失败。或者，中国领导人可能会升级武力，因为他们相信已经占了上风、常规冲突可以战胜美国，结束长期以来无结果的低强度冲突。我们避免猜测把低强度战争转变为高强度战争的确切路径或具体驱动因素，而是认为领导层在对低强度战争的进展不满后转为高强度战争。在转向高强度战争的过程中，中国政府很可能会调整其国家战略，将国家生存和击败美国这个竞争对手放在首位（表 7.1略——译者注）。随着对威胁的认识提高，并愿意承担极高的风险，我们认为中国政府将提高对胜利的要求。为了证明转向潜在灾难性大战是合理的，中国政府可能会调整其战争目标，寻求有效削弱美国实力。这种最终状态是——接受美国作为一个国家继续存在、但其实力被削弱，以至于在数年甚至数十年内都无法对中国构成威胁。中国可能愿意容忍更高水平的破坏，并表现出更高的武力意愿来追求这样一个理想的最终状态。这可能意味着它将寻求大幅削弱美国作战能力和经济实力，同时，中国希望减少对自身军事和经济实力的损害和破坏程度，以免在战后重建国力。
简而言之，我们认为，制定和实施高强度战争的主要目标是迅速、果断地削弱美国的实力，以至于美国别无选择，只能在中国主导的新秩序中接受从属地位。简而言之，中国会把战争视为果断解决全球领导权问题的途径。中国政府可能不会一开始就提出这样的要求，事实上它可能会以更有限的目标开始一场常规战争，但中美竞争的结构性驱动因素将使其难以避免最终得出这样的结论。
The onset of hostilities with the United States would by definition primarily be a large-scale military conflict, though the struggle for supremacy in economics, diplomacy, and other domains could escalate as well. With the onset of a high-stakes power transition “war of decision,” the impact on both the Chinese and U.S. economies and political situations could be profound. In China, for example, severe damage to the economy could incentivize Beijing to incur massive debt to pay for the war, ramp up repression of a discontented popu-lace, and adopt a more radicalized ideology to mobilize popular support and justify the war’s potentially staggering costs in lives and resources. China’s foreign policy to support the real-ization of its goal of national revival would likely change dramatically as well, with an aggres-sive focus on demonizing the United States, punishing U.S. supporters, and rallying interna-tional supporters in a manner similar to how major belligerents behaved in World War II. Its aims for remaking the international order might also become more expansive or radicalized, though we will set aside speculation on the details of the various possible political goals of a U.S.-China conflict as beyond the scope of this report.
根据定义，与美国的敌对行动将主要是大规模军事冲突，尽管在经济、外交和其他领域的争霸也可能升级。随着一场高风险的权力交接 "决定战 "的打响，中美两国的经济和政治形势都将受到深远影响。以中国为例，经济的严重破坏可能会促使中国政府举借巨额债务为战争买单，加大对不满民众的掌控力度，采用更加激进的意识形态来动员民众支持，并为战争可能付出的巨大生命和资源代价进行辩解。中国为支持实现民族复兴目标而采取的外交政策也可能会发生巨大变化，其重点将是咄咄逼人地妖魔化美国，惩罚美国的支持者，并以类似于主要交战国在二战中的行为方式拉拢国际支持者。其重塑国际秩序的目标也可能变得更加宽泛或激进，但由于超出了本报告的讨论范围，我们暂且不对美中冲突的各种可能政治目标的细节进行猜测。
These national strategic goals in turn frame and inform how Beijing might direct the PLA to carry out its operations against the United States. Some of the assumptions from Chap-ter Six still hold. We assume that the CCP remains in power throughout this time frame, and we assume that the leadership seeks to avoid engaging in a devastating war of nuclear annihi-lation, though it may be open to the limited use of nuclear weapons. Chinese leaders may also be willing to entertain extensive cyberspace and outer space attacks to cripple U.S. power. Many of the developments outlined in Chapter Six can be assumed to have occurred as a sort of “road to war.” In other words, China and the United States have escalated tensions to the point of indirect conflict spanning much of the world. The global economy will likely have become more chaotic and experience significant disruption.
这些国家战略目标反过来又为中国政府如何指挥解放军开展反美行动提供了依据。第六章中的一些假设仍然有效。我们假定中国共产党在这一时期内始终执政，并假定其领导层寻求避免参与毁灭性的核毁灭战争，尽管它可能对有限使用核武器持开放态度。中国领导人可能也愿意接受广泛的网络空间和外层空间攻击，以削弱美国的力量。第六章概述的许多事态发展可以被认为是一种 "通往战争之路"。换句话说，中国和美国的紧张局势已经升级到间接冲突的地步，波及世界大部分地区。全球经济很可能会变得更加混乱，并经历严重破坏。
China’s Wartime Military Strategy
中国战时军事战略
In this section we explore how Chinese leaders might define the nation’s principal threats and the military’s missions and objectives in light of the onset of high-intensity war. We will also explore how leaders might refine guidance on building and operating military force.
在本节中，我们将探讨中国领导人如何根据高强度战争的来临界定国家的主要威胁以及军队的任务和目标。我们还将探讨领导人如何完善军队建设和运作的指导原则。
Principal Threats
主要威胁
In a situation featuring high-intensity war, the threat posed by the United States and its allies and partners would become the obvious, most pressing priority. Beijing would, however, be focused on defeating the United States. Knocking the United States out of the war could, after all, severely undermine the motivation and ability of other countries to continue the fight. War with the United States would probably entail war with key U.S. allies in Asia. This is because Chinese leaders would probably direct the military to destroy major U.S. military assets such as advanced warships and aircraft based close to China and capable of threaten-ing the nation’s vulnerable seaboard. Owing to the severity of the danger posed by the United States and its allies, this would mean a severe downgrading in priority of all other threats. However, we assume that Beijing is unlikely to compromise on its core interests. Given the tension between competing objectives, we assume that China opts to defer resolution of key issues or only takes them on if relevant military operations can help China achieve its goals against the United States. For example, Chinese leaders may view Taiwan through the lens of how an attack might lure in U.S. forces that could in turn be destroyed by awaiting PLA forces.
在高强度战争的情况下，美国及其盟友和伙伴构成的威胁显然是最紧迫的优先事项。然而，中国政府将集中精力击败美国，毕竟，让美国退出战争会严重削弱其他国家继续战斗的动力和能力。与美国开战很可能会导致与美国在亚洲的主要盟友开战，这是因为中国领导人很可能会指示军方摧毁美国的主要军事资产，如驻扎在中国附近、能够威胁中国脆弱沿海地区的先进战舰和飞机。由于美国及其盟国所构成威胁的严重性，这将意味着所有其他威胁的优先级都将严重下降。然而，我们认为北京不太可能在其核心利益上做出让步。鉴于相互竞争的目标之间存在紧张关系，我们假设中国会选择推迟解决关键问题，或者只有在相关军事行动能帮助中国实现对抗美国的目标时才会着手解决。例如，中国领导人可能会从攻击台湾可能引诱美军的角度来看待台湾问题，而美军可能会被等待的解放军部队摧毁。
As direct combat escalated, Beijing would also likely have to prepare for contingencies on multiple fronts, dealing with U.S. allies and other countries that opt to align with Wash-ington. Few countries, especially in the Indo-Pacific, would probably remain neutral in a major war between China and the United States, since each country would have a strong incentive to align itself with the anticipated victor in hopes of reaping the rewards of loyalty. The coalitions could span much of the world but lack the cohesiveness of those in the wars of the Industrial Age. With limited power projection capability and a higher degree of interde-pendent relations with both China and the United States, countries in either coalition might operate with a higher degree of autonomy and coordinate in a looser fashion than might have been the case in past wars. PLA forces could find themselves engaged in fighting on multiple fronts, although major combat would be most likely along China’s periphery, where the PLA could deploy more easily. Nontraditional hazards would likely drop in priority as the PLA grappled with more pressing threats (see Table 7.2).
随着直接交战的升级，中国政府可能还必须为多条战线上的突发事件做好准备，应对美国盟友和其他选择与华盛顿结盟的国家。很少有国家，尤其是印度洋——太平洋地区的国家，会在中美之间的大规模战争中保持中立，因为每个国家都有强烈的动机与预期的胜利者结盟，希望获得忠诚的回报。这些联盟可能横跨世界大部分地区，但缺乏工业时代战争中的凝聚力。由于力量投送能力有限，而且与中国和美国的相互依存关系程度较高，任何一个联盟中的国家都可能拥有较高程度的自主权，协调方式也可能比以往战争中更为松散。解放军部队可能会参与多条战线的战斗，但主要战斗最有可能发生在中国周边地区，因为解放军可以更容易地部署到这些地区。随着解放军要应对更紧迫的威胁，非传统危险的优先级可能会下降（见表 7.2略——译者）。
Military Missions and Objectives
军事任务和目标
In a high-intensity war the Chinese leadership would issue a new wartime set of missions. Compared with the peacetime “historic missions” or even the missions outlined in the low-intensity war, the high-intensity war effort would direct the PLA to prioritize a decisive defeat of U.S. military power and preservation of the nation’s hopes of achieving the China Dream. The PLA would be directed to also prevent nuclear annihilation or national collapse. Ensur-ing the CCP’s rule would likely also remain a priority. Other missions could be demoted in priority. The PLA would be expected to defend the nation’s sovereignty and territory, of course, but operations to compel Taiwan’s unification could be delayed or reconceived in terms of operations to cripple U.S. forces. Similarly, the mission to defend overseas interests, while important, might become second in priority, owing in part to the difficulty of fielding forces so far away in a contested environment (see Table 7.3).
在高强度战争中，中国领导人将发布一系列新的战时任务。与和平时期的 "历史使命 "相比，甚至与低烈度战争中的使命相比，高烈度战争将指导解放军优先考虑决定性地击败美国军事力量，并保留国家实现 "中国梦 "的希望。解放军还必须防止核毁灭或国家崩溃。确保中国共产党的领导可能仍将是优先事项。其他任务的优先级可能会降低。解放军当然要捍卫国家主权和领土，但迫使台湾统一的行动可能会被推迟，或被重新设想为削弱美军的行动。同样，保卫海外利益的任务虽然重要，但可能会成为次要任务，部分原因是在有争议的环境中很难在如此遥远的地方部署部队（见表 7.3略——译者注）。
High-End Systemic War: Force Development
高端系统战争：军力发展
The onset of high-intensity war provides a compelling incentive for senior leaders in China to direct a general mobilization and maximize the war effort. A full analysis of how China might revise its military modernization program in light of a major war with the United States lies outside the bounds of this report, but we do suggest several strategic options that could be most relevant to potential conflict scenarios. In contrast to the low-intensity sce-nario, in which the political imperative to demonstrate Chinese superiority and maintain prestige incentivized the preservation of costly, high-end platforms, a China engaged in high-intensity war could be more open to risk-taking in hopes of achieving decisive victory. The PLA’s most elite forces would perhaps seek to engage U.S. forces, but on favorable terms in which the PLA could hope for a reasonable chance of success. Baiting U.S. forces to fight within China’s counterintervention envelope would serve such an imperative best. An exam-ple might be a Chinese attack against a U.S. ally or partner within the first island chain; the attack would be designed to lure U.S. forces in for a devastating Chinese counterattack.
高强度战争的爆发为中国高层领导指挥总动员和最大限度地提高战争努力提供了令人信服的动力。全面分析中国如何在与美国爆发大规模战争的情况下修改其军事现代化计划超出了本报告的范围，但我们确实提出了几种可能与潜在冲突情况最相关的战略选择。在低烈度情况下，展示中国优势和维护威望的政治需要促使中国保留昂贵的高端平台，相比之下，参与高烈度战争的中国可能更愿意承担风险，希望取得决定性的胜利。解放军最精锐的部队也许会寻求与美军交战，但条件是解放军有希望获得合理的胜算。诱使美军在中国的反介入包围圈内作战最符合这种需要。例如，中国可能会在第一岛链内攻击美国的盟友或合作伙伴；攻击的目的是引诱美军参与中国的毁灭性反击。
High on the list of acquisitions would probably be long-range missiles, bombers, sub-marines, and unmanned systems. As in Chapter Six, these capabilities offer the potential to severely damage U.S. military forces without requiring intricate joint maneuvers. Other pri-orities could include air defense weapons to deter strikes on the mainland. Beijing might also direct defense industries to produce low-cost but capable weapons and platforms to arm and equip client states around the world to fight U.S.-backed forces.
采购清单上名列前茅的可能是远程导弹、轰炸机、潜艇和无人系统。正如在第六章中，这些能力提供了在不需要复杂的联合机动的情况下严重破坏美国军事力量的潜力。其他优先事项可能包括防空武器，以阻止对大陆的打击。北京还可能指导国防工业生产低成本但功能强大的武器和平台，来武装和装备世界各地的客户国，以打击美国支持的部队。
The paragraphs that follow review possible changes in the PLA’s force development. Given the cost of military development and the likely disruption to the global economy that would accompany U.S.-China hostilities, both countries would face hard constraints on their ability to ramp up defense spending. Given the urgency of prevailing in high-intensity war, Beijing might be willing to tolerate a massive increase in defense spending for a brief period of time in hopes that such a major buildup could enable rapid victory.
以下各段回顾了解放军部队发展变化。考虑到军事发展的成本以及美中敌对行动可能对全球经济造成的破坏，两国在增加国防开支方面都将面临硬约束。考虑到在高强度战争中获胜的紧迫性，中国政府可能愿意在短时间内容忍国防开支的大规模增长，希望这种大规模集结能够迅速取得胜利。
Missile forces.As an assumed favored weapon system that accommodates China’s prefer-ence for centralized control and reduced risk for prestige platforms, we assume that the PLA increases its inventory of long-range and precision strike cruise and ballistic missiles, includ-ing hypersonic glide missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. The PLA Rocket Force would likely increase its inventory of nuclear warheads as part of the effort to increase deter-rence and harden nuclear facilities to defend against potential attack. China could develop new ground-based delivery vehicles to launch missiles more easily and cheaply for its client militaries. China could also be expected to expand its inventory of missile defense capabili-ties to counter U.S. long-range precision strike systems.
导弹部队。我们假定中国人民解放军将增加其远程和精确打击巡航导弹和弹道导弹的库存，包括高超音速滑翔导弹和洲际弹道导弹，作为一种假定的武器系统，以满足中国对集中控制和降低威望平台风险的偏好。中国人民解放军火箭军可能会增加核弹头库存，以增强威慑力和加固核设施以抵御潜在攻击。中国可能会开发新的地面运载工具，为其客户军队更便捷、更廉价地发射导弹。预计中国还将扩大导弹防御能力，以对抗美国的远程精确打击。
Cybersecurity forces.As in the low-intensity scenario, the PLA has a strong incentive to significantly increase cybersecurity units for purposes of improving the cyber defense of China and key client states. Cybersecurity units come at relatively low cost. The PLA could target the networks of the U.S. military and those of key U.S. allies and partners. China could also expand its financing and support for proxy cybersecurity groups in other countries such as Russia to carry out cyberattacks on U.S. and allied networks.
网络安全部队。与低强度情况下一样，解放军有强烈的动机大幅增加网络安全部队，以提高中国和主要客户国的网络防御能力。网络安全部队的成本相对较低。解放军可能会将目标对准美军以及美国重要盟友和合作伙伴的网络。中国还可能扩大对俄罗斯等其他国家代理网络安全组织的资助和支持，以对美国和盟国网络实施网络攻击。
Unmanned combat systems.China could employ unmanned combat aircraft and naval ships to attack U.S. forces in a manner that supports a centralized command system and minimizes the need for complex joint operations. It could also proliferate various unmanned strike aircraft to client militaries to support their own war efforts against U.S.-backed forces.
无人作战系统。中国可以使用无人作战飞机和海军舰艇攻击美军，这种方式可以支持中央指挥系统，最大限度地减少复杂联合行动的需要。中国还可以向客户军队扩散各种无人攻击机，以支持其自身对美国支持的部队的作战努力。
Outer space and C4ISR.With combat operations expanding around the world, the PLA would have a strong incentive to upgrade and improve its ability to carry out surveillance, communication, and reconnaissance around the world. Space-based and unmanned assets could be key to those missions and might accordingly see expansions in capability. China might expand its inventory of weapons to target U.S. space-based assets and improve secu-rity for Chinese space-based systems and ISR. Replicating a method that would likely char-acterize many Chinese efforts, civilian entities could augment military capabilities. China could also lean on the governments in client states to share their C4ISR capabilities and to expand access for Chinese military units, which could become even more important given the risks of an outer space war.
外层空间与指挥、控制、通信、计算机、情报及监视与侦察。随着作战行动在全球范围内的扩展，解放军将有强烈的动机升级和改进其在全球范围内实施监视、通信和侦察的能力。天基和无人资产可能是这些任务的关键，因此可能会相应地增强能力。中国可能会扩大针对美国天基资产的武器库存，并提高中国天基系统和情报侦察监视的安全性。民间实体可以复制中国许多努力的方法，增强军事能力。中国还可以依靠客户国政府分享其指挥、控制、通信、计算机、情报及监视与侦察能力，并扩大中国军事单位的访问权限，鉴于外太空战争的风险，这一点可能变得更加重要。
The PLA Army.The PLAA might see a significant expansion of funding to build capable joint expeditionary units capable of carrying a range of combat operations along the periph-ery and to support limited power projection missions as far as Africa and the Middle East. China could be willing to risk its more elite, integrated joint units for combat operations against pro-U.S. neighbors such as Taiwan or other countries.
解放军陆军。中国人民解放军可能会大幅增加经费，以建立有能力的联合远征部队，能够在周边地区执行一系列作战行动，并支持远至非洲和中东的有限力量投送任务。中国可能愿意让其更为精锐的一体化联合部队冒险参与针对亲美邻国（如台湾<报告居然把台湾列为国家这是严重践踏中国尊严的行径——译者注>或其他国家）的作战行动。
The PLA Air Force.The PLA Air Force would probably prioritize the expansion of its inventory of Y-20 long-distance transport aircraft and supporting mission aircraft to sup-port expeditionary combat missions abroad. Expanding the ranks of long-distance bombers such as the H-20 and refueling tankers could also be a top priority, as these could be used to provide support to PLA combat operations at distant locations and to the war efforts of important client militaries. The PLA Air Force would also aim to expand its inventory of advanced fighter aircraft, such as the J-20 and J-35, though to curb war expenses Beijing might try to rely on air defense missiles and unmanned systems to protect the country’s airspace.
中国人民解放军空军。解放军空军可能会优先扩大运-20 长途运输机和支援任务飞机的库存，以支持海外远征作战任务。扩大 H-20 等远程轰炸机和加油机的数量也可能是重中之重，因为这些飞机可用于支持解放军在遥远地区的作战行动以及重要客户军队的战争努力。解放军空军还将致力于扩大其先进战斗机（如歼-20 和歼-35）的库存，不过，为了控制战争开支，中国政府可能会尝试依靠防空导弹和无人系统来保护国家领空。
The PLA Navy.In a high-intensity conflict scenario, China would rely on the PLA Navy to deter potential attacks along China’s periphery and the Indian Ocean. Submarines, in par-ticular, could be valuable for menacing adversary navies along the Indian Ocean. Surface ships are extremely vulnerable, of course, so Beijing may opt not to replace major combatants destroyed in the war. Instead it might rely on civilian contractors to move troops and equip-ment in disguised ships. Alternatively, China might rely on overland transportation networks through its partnership with Russia to field forces to Africa and the Middle East.
中国人民解放军海军。在高强度冲突的情况下，中国将依靠中国人民解放军海军遏制沿中国周边和印度洋的潜在攻击。尤其是潜艇，对于威胁印度洋沿岸的敌国海军非常重要。当然，水面舰艇极其脆弱，因此中国政府可能选择不替换在战争中被摧毁的主要作战舰艇。相反，中国可能会依靠民间承包商用伪装的船只运送部队和装备。另外，中国也可能通过与俄罗斯的伙伴关系，依靠陆路运输网络向非洲和中东派遣部队。
The PLA Navy Marine Corps.In a high-intensity war scenario, the PLA might rely on an expanded PLA Navy Marine Corps to augment expeditionary ground forces for limited power projection missions through the South China Sea and into the Indian Ocean. However, ensuring the survivability of large assault ships loaded with troops in an era of global preci-sion strike would raise the risk and cost of amphibious operations and sea-based deployments of major combat forces. Instead China might rely on the deployment of modest-size combat formations by air or only attempt such amphibious assaults if such ships could be escorted by robust protective naval forces.
解放军海军陆战队。在高强度战争情况下，中国人民解放军可能会依靠扩大后的海军陆战队来增强远征地面部队的力量，通过南海和印度洋执行有限的力量投送任务。然而，在全球精确打击时代，确保满载部队的大型攻击舰的生存能力将提高两栖作战和海基部署主力作战部队的风险和成本。相反，中国可能会依靠空运部署规模适中的战斗编队，或者只有在两栖攻击舰艇能得到强大的海军保护部队护航的情况下才尝试两栖攻击。
Special forces (all services).China could expand the number of special forces for all ser-vices. These troops would play an important role in both direct and indirect combat with U.S. forces. In direct combat operations, special forces could carry out elite light infantry duties including sabotage, reconnaissance, support to air strikes, and support to combat operations. In indirect conflicts, the special forces could help train and guide the efforts of client military forces.
特种部队（所有军种）。中国可以扩大各军种特种部队的数量。这些部队将在与美军的直接和间接作战中发挥重要作用。在直接作战行动中，特种部队可执行精锐轻步兵任务，包括破坏、侦察、支援空袭和支援作战行动。在间接冲突中，特种部队可以帮助训练和指导客户军队的工作。
Bases and facilities.In a state of Chinese near global primacy, we assume that China would have successfully leveraged its economic prowess to gain access in key locations along BRI routes, especially in Central and Southeast Asia. As part of its preparations for high-intensity war, Beijing would lean hard on its partner nations to provide full military access. Thus, for purposes of this analysis, we assume that PLA forces are able to deploy the full range of forces in such Southeast Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. In Central Asia, PAP and PLA special forces could have access to facili-ties to support limited combat operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We assume that in a showdown between China and the United States, Russia would opt to support China. Accord-ingly, Russia could agree to arrangements resembling an alliance and allow Chinese troops to transit overland to locations in the Middle East. We assume that the China-Iran relation-ship could become closer to an alliance as well, though as a result China could find itself enmeshed to some extent in Iran’s wars with its Sunni rivals. In Africa, PLA forces could seek to set up long-range antiair and anti-ship missile launchers in client states located on both the eastern and western African coasts. The Djibouti base could experience upgrading to accommodate forward-deployed joint combat forces, which might carry out operations in support of client states in the Levant, North Africa, or perhaps even the Balkans. China might also seek to expand military access and some sort of support facilities in partner states in the Caribbean and Latin America, such as Cuba or Venezuela, where it could stage missiles to threaten U.S. military aircraft, ships, or even territory. All of these facilities would be vulner-able to attack by U.S.-backed forces, however, and China’s limited ability to project power would constrain its ability to ensure the survival of its more distant assets.
基地和设施。在中国几乎接近全球主导地位的情况下，我们假定中国已成功利用其经济实力在一带一路沿线的关键地点、尤其是中亚和东南亚地区获得了准入。
作为高强度战争准备的一部分，中国政府会极力要求其伙伴国提供全面的军事准入。因此，在本分析中，我们假定解放军部队能够在孟加拉国、柬埔寨、缅甸、斯里兰卡和泰国等东南亚国家部署全部兵力。在中亚，人民行动党（新加坡主要政党——译者注）和解放军特种部队可以使用设施支持在阿富汗和巴基斯坦的有限作战行动。我们假设，在中美摊牌时，俄罗斯会选择支持中国。相应地，俄罗斯可能会同意类似于联盟的安排，允许中国军队经陆路前往中东地区。我们认为，中国与伊朗的关系也可能更接近于联盟关系，但中国可能会因此在一定程度上卷入伊朗与逊尼派对手的战争。在非洲，解放军部队可能会寻求在非洲东西海岸的客户国设置远程反空和反舰导弹发射装置。吉布提基地可能会进行升级改造，以容纳前沿部署的联合作战部队，这些部队可能会在黎凡特、北非甚至巴尔干地区的客户国开展行动。中国还可能寻求在加勒比海和拉丁美洲的伙伴国扩大军事通道和某种支持设施、 诸如在古巴或委内瑞拉等地部署导弹，威胁美国的军用飞机、舰船甚至领土。然而，所有这些设施都很容易受到美国支持部队的攻击，中国有限的力量投射能力将制约其确保较远资产生存的能力。
Force Employment
军力应用
To prevail in a high-intensity war, Chinese leaders could direct aggressive offensive opera-tions aimed at dismantling the U.S. ability to continue the fight. But the struggle for interna-tional leadership and influence could dramatically affect how the PLA contemplates combat operations and its approach to risk and escalation. With heightened stakes and a more total form of combat, China’s tolerance of risk could increase significantly. Eagerness to prevail in battle and avoid decisive defeat could drive China’s military to risk its most elite units and platforms in dramatic attacks on U.S. forces. However, PLA commanders would probably still hope to reduce the risks by fighting the U.S. military on favorable terrain, such as within the first island chain, where the PLA’s counter intervention forces could inflict punishing losses.
为了在高强度战争中取得胜利，中国领导人可能会指挥咄咄逼人的进攻行动，旨在削弱美国继续作战的能力。但是，争夺国际领导权和影响力的斗争可能会极大地影响解放军考虑作战行动的方式及其应对风险和升级的方法。随着利害关系的增加和战斗形式的全面化，中国对风险的承受能力可能会大大提高。在战斗中取得胜利并避免决定性失败的迫切愿望可能会促使中国军队冒险动用最精锐的部队和平台对美军发动戏剧性的攻击。然而，解放军指挥官可能仍希望通过在有利地形与美军作战来降低风险，例如在第一岛链内，解放军的反介入部队可在此对美军造成惩罚性损失。
A high-intensity conflict with the United States would likely provide a compelling incen-tive for Chinese military leaders to adopt more aggressive guiding principles on the use of force while still emphasizing the importance of “war control.” While we do not know exactly how the guidance might change, we can project some possibilities based on existing precepts. These precepts provide a starting point for analyzing how PLA forces might operate in the opening days of high-intensity conflict. Past wars demonstrate, however, that new technolo-gies and operational concepts would likely arise over the course of the war, which suggests that many of these precepts could become outdated soon after the war began. At the start of the conflict, the PLA might adhere to many of the guiding principles outlined in Chapter Six. The biggest change would involve those related to the actual conduct of combat operations.
和美国的高强度冲突很可能为中国军方领导人提供的令人信服的诱因，促使他们在强调 "战争控制 "重要性的同时，在使用武力问题上采取更加激进的指导原则。虽然我们并不确切清楚指导原则可能会发生怎样的变化，但我们可以根据现有的戒律预测一些可能性。这些戒律为分析解放军部队在高强度冲突初期如何行动提供了起点。然而，以往的战争表明，在战争过程中很可能会出现新的技术和作战概念，这就意味着许多戒律可能在战争开始后不久就会过时。在冲突开始时，解放军可能会遵守第六章概述的许多指导原则。最大的变化将涉及那些与实际作战行动有关的原则。
Employ “intelligentized” systems-of-systems doctrines in combat.In its combat operations with U.S. troops, elite PLA units could be deployed and trained to use the most advanced technologies, such as AI-enabled weaponry, sensors, and platforms. Consistent with cur-rent PLA theory, troops in this scenario might also prepare for battle guided by the most advanced warfighting doctrines, such as that of “intelligentized war” and systems-of-systems warfare. China’s concept of “integrated joint operations” envisions a flexible combination of information systems and networks that enables Chinese military planners to fuse the “opera-tional strengths” from each of the PLA’s services. The notion of integrated joint operations is closely linked to the concept of “informatization” and “systems confrontation” or systems-of-systems warfare. Informatization forms the core of these joint operations and consists of information networks to integrate and systematize operations to achieve information supe-riority. The systems-of-systems warfare concept is based on linking command automation,ISR, precision strike, and rapid mobility to quickly strike an enemy’s system of vital nodes. According to the 2015 defense white paper, its main features may be distilled as “information dominance, precision strikes, and integrated joint forces.” These units are most likely to be employed in combat along China’s periphery, where the full range of technological capabili-ties could be brought to bear and the risk of devastating losses minimized. Outside the imme-diate periphery, Chinese combat forces could consist of simpler formations with a lower level of joint capability. PLA forces could instead rely on unmanned systems, cyberoperations, and long-range strike options to reduce the need for complex joint operations and decentralized command authority. To enable this type of war, forward-deployed PLA assets would require robust ISR capabilities. Thus, PLA forces fighting outside the first island chain could consist primarily of ISR specialists and various missile and unmanned strike platforms accompanied by small ground units to defend them.
在作战中采用 "智能化 "系统理论。在与美军的作战行动中，解放军精锐部队可以部署并训练使用最先进的技术，如人工智能武器、传感器和平台。与解放军当前的理论相一致，在这种情况下，部队也可能在最先进的作战理论指导下做好战斗准备，如 "智能化战争 "和 "综合系统战争"。中国的 "一体化联合作战 "概念设想了信息系统和网络的灵活组合，使中国军事规划人员能够融合解放军各军种的 "作战力量"。一体化联合行动的概念与 "信息化 "和 "系统对抗 "或系统战的概念密切相关。信息化是这些联合行动的核心，由信息网络组成，以实现行动的一体化和系统化，从而达到信息至上的目的。系统作战概念的基础是将指挥自动化、情报监视侦察、精确打击和快速机动联系起来，以快速打击敌方的重要节点系统。根据 2015 年国防白皮书，其主要特征可提炼为 "信息主导、精确打击和一体化联合部队"。这些部队最有可能在中国周边地区的战斗中使用，在那里可以发挥全部技术能力，并将毁灭性损失的风险降至最低。在周边地区以外，中国作战部队可能由联合能力较低的简单编队组成。解放军部队可以依靠无人系统、网络作战和远程打击手段来减少对复杂联合作战和分散指挥权的需求。为实现这种战争，前沿部署的解放军资产需要强大的情报侦察监视能力。因此，在第一岛链外作战的解放军部队可能主要由情报侦察监视专家、各种导弹和无人攻击平台组成，并由小规模地面部队进行防御。
Seize information superiority first.PLA writings consistently emphasize the importance of seizing information superiority in the opening moments of combat. PLA forces may first seek to seize the information advantage by disrupting or destroying the adversary’s flow of information and establishing superior ISR. Combat forces could then target key nodes via precision munitions with an aim to establishing comprehensive dominance. The goal would be to render the enemy incapable of resisting, not the total destruction of all forces. The focus on seizing information superiority could incentivize the PLA to prioritize the deployment of ISR assets to distant bases and facilities, followed by appropriate combat forces. Chinese combat assets could also prioritize destruction of U.S. ISR assets in the opening moments of any engagement.
首先夺取信息优势。解放军的著作一直强调在战斗开始时夺取信息优势的重要性。解放军部队可能首先通过干扰或破坏对手的信息流和建立优势情报侦察监视来夺取信息优势。然后，作战部队可通过精确弹药瞄准关键节点，以建立全面优势。目标是使敌人失去抵抗能力，而不是彻底摧毁所有部队。注重夺取信息优势可促使解放军优先将情报侦察监视资产部署到遥远的基地和设施，然后再部署适当的作战部队。中国的作战资产也可在交战开始时优先摧毁美国的情报侦察监视资产。
Destroy key enemy nodes.Consistent with the doctrines of systems-of-systems warfare, PLA forces could prioritize strikes and operations that target command and control and other key nodes vital to the war system of the adversary. The goal of systems confrontation is “comprehensive dominance” in all domains, including land, sea, air, outer space, cyber-space, the electromagnetic domain, and even the psychological domain. Chinese writings espouse a method that seeks to paralyze and even destroy critical functions of an enemy’s operational system. According to the PLA, the enemy will “lose the will and ability to resist” once its operational system cannot function. The PLA may employ kinetic and nonkinetic attacks to achieve this goal. PLA writings identify four target types to paralyze the enemy’s operational system: the first consists of strikes to degrade or disrupt the enemy’s information flow; the second attacks essential factors, such as C4ISR and firepower capabilities; the third consists of strikes against the physical nodes of the C4ISR and firepower operational systems; and the fourth targets the time sequence and/or tempo of the enemy’s operational architec- ture. In a high-intensity war with the United States, the PLA could rely on an expanded inventory of missiles to target such nodes. While military writings emphasize destroying the enemy’s will to resist, it may not be enough for purposes of the broader war with the United States. Instead, destruction of key nodes could be a first step toward destroying hard-to-replace high-intensity U.S. military platforms. The purpose of such large-scale devastation of U.S. military platforms and weaponry would be to inflict such crippling losses that the United States could not easily regenerate forces for many years.
摧毁敌方关键节点。根据 "综合系统 "作战理论，解放军部队可优先打击和行动，目标是对手的指挥控制和其他对战争系统至关重要的关键节点。系统对抗的目标是在陆、海、空、外太空、网络空间、电磁领域甚至心理领域等所有领域实现 "全面优势"。中国的著作推崇一种旨在瘫痪甚至摧毁敌方作战系统关键功能的方法。根据解放军的说法，一旦敌方作战系统无法运行，敌方就会 "失去抵抗的意志和能力"。为实现这一目标，解放军可能会使用动能和非动能攻击。解放军的著作确定了瘫痪敌方作战系统的四种目标类型：第一种是削弱或破坏敌方信息流的打击；第二种是攻击基本要素，如指挥、控制、通信、计算机、情报及监视与侦察和火力能力；第三种是打击指挥、控制、通信、计算机、情报及监视与侦察和火力作战系统的物理节点；第四种是针对敌方作战架构的时序和/或节奏。在与美国的高强度战争中，解放军可以依靠扩大的导弹库存来打击这些节点。虽然军事著作强调摧毁敌方的抵抗意志，但这对于更广泛的对美战争而言可能还不够。相反，摧毁关键节点可能是摧毁难以替代的高强度美军平台的第一步。对美国军事平台和武器装备进行这种大规模破坏的目的是造成严重损失，使美国在许多年内都无法轻易重建部队。
These admittedly speculative guiding principles provide a sense of how central leaders might seek to manage and control the role of military forces in a comprehensive, whole-of-government struggle for supremacy against the United States, at least in the opening phases of high-intensity war. The PLA would aim to wipe out large parts of the U.S. military by luring it into battles within the first island chain, where the full weight of advanced PLA capabilities could be brought to bear. China would also aim to forward-deploy ISR, missile, unmanned, and other limited combat capabilities in client states throughout the world in the lead-up to the decision to initiate high-intensity war. These far-flung forces might not be able to operate according to the most advanced doctrines, but their purpose would be simpler: to target and destroy passing U.S. military aircraft and ships or other targets of opportunity.
我们对于中国这些指导原则诚然是推测性的，但至少在高强度战争的开局阶段，我们可以从这些原则中了解到中央领导人可能会如何设法管理和控制军队在一场全面的、全国性的反美争霸战中的作用。解放军的目标是通过引诱美军进入第一岛链内的战斗来消灭美军的大部分兵力，在第一岛链内的战斗中，解放军的先进能力可以得到充分发挥。在决定发动高强度战争之前，中国还将在世界各地的客户国前沿部署情报侦察监视、导弹、无人机和其他有限的作战能力。这些遥远的部队可能无法按照最先进的理论进行作战，但其目的将更为简单：瞄准并摧毁路过的美国军用飞机和舰船或其他机会目标。
How War Might Unfold
战争如何开打
The examples of the most recent great power wars—those of World Wars I and II—suggest that a U.S.- China high-intensity, systemic war could prove to be long lasting and highly destructive. The examples also suggest that in the course of such a war, new technologies and methods of warfare could emerge that are unimaginable today. Of course, a high-intensity war could also turn out differently, with a possibly shorter duration or lesser degree of destruction. We have no way of estimating how the war might progress and will refrain from attempts to do so. Instead, in this section we will explore how some of the opening battles and fights might unfold.
最近的大国战争——第一次和第二次世界大战的例子表明，一场美中高强度、系统性的战争可能会被证明是持久的、极具破坏性的。这些例子还表明，在这样一场战争中，可能会出现今天难以想象的新技术和新作战方法。当然，高强度战争的结果也可能不同，持续时间可能更短，破坏程度可能更小。我们无法估计战争会如何发展，也不会试图这样做。在本节中，我们将探讨一些开场战役和战斗可能会如何展开。
In our analysis, the primary theaters of war could center on traditional hot spots along China’s first island chain. But U.S.-China conventional conflict could also erupt in more dis-tant locations along BRI routes. Moreover, the onset of high-intensity war would not neces-sarily end the low-intensity war. Indirect, low-intensity war across the globe could continue or intensify as China and the United States fought each other directly, owing to the relative low cost of maintaining many of those commitments. Moreover, the escalation of war could coincide with a continuation or worsening of many of the transnational threats and multi-lateral fighting between partners of either belligerent. Chinese and U.S. military resources could be severely stressed by nearly overwhelming demands from traditional and nontra-ditional sources. Combat operations between the two nations would probably also coincide with a broader informational, diplomatic, and economic struggle for dominance.
根据我们的分析，主要战区可能集中在中国第一岛链沿线的传统热点地区。但中美常规冲突也可能在一带一路沿线的更多热点地区爆发。此外，高强度战争的爆发并不一定会结束低强度战争。由于维持这些承诺的成本相对较低，全球范围内的间接、低烈度战争可能会随着中美直接交战而继续或加剧。此外，在战争升级的同时，交战双方伙伴之间的许多跨国威胁和多边战斗也可能继续或恶化。中美两国的军事资源可能会因来自传统和非传统来源的几乎压倒性需求而压力空前。两国之间的作战行动很可能还会与更广泛的信息、外交和经济主导权争夺战同时进行。
The result could be a long-lasting war with periodic, destructive battles involving conven-tional forces followed by longer periods of intermittent, smaller scale skirmishes that would provide opportunities to reconstitute forces. Alongside the occasional high-intensity battles, China and the United States could maintain a near consistent low-intensity war in many parts of the world, exploiting disorder and stress to drain the rival’s resources. Cyber, infor-mation operations, and other economic warfare could continue as well. The war would prob-ably inflict severe damage on the world’s economy and possibly lead to a global economic depression. The populations of both major belligerents and in many parts of the world could experience considerable unrest and instability owing to the stresses of war. A desire to bring the war to a close and restore economic growth and social stability could lead to the experi-mental use of even more destructive escalatory options, including tactical nuclear weapons, cyberattacks on civilian infrastructure, and attacks on space infrastructure. Failure to con-trol escalation could result in truly nightmare scenarios of annihilation and breakdown. The duration of the war could depend on the ability of the belligerents to endure the pain of eco-nomic disruption and political instability as well as manage the effects of escalation. But even if the worst outcomes were avoided, the outlook for high-intensity war of any variety appears unavoidably grim.
其结果可能是一场旷日持久的战争，先是军队进行周期性的破坏性战斗，然后是较长时间的间歇性小规模冲突，为部队重组提供机会。除了偶尔发生的高强度战斗，中国和美国还可能在世界许多地区保持近乎持续的低强度战争，利用混乱和压力消耗对手的资源，网络战、信息战和其他经济战也可以继续。战争很可能对世界经济造成严重破坏，并可能导致全球经济萧条。由于战争的压力，交战双方和世界许多地区的人民可能会经历相当大的动荡和不稳定。结束战争、恢复经济增长和社会稳定的愿望可能会导致尝试性地使用更具破坏性的升级方案，包括战术核武器、对民用基础设施的网络攻击以及对太空基础设施的攻击。 如果不能控制战争升级，就可能导致真正噩梦般的毁灭和崩溃。战争的持续时间可能取决于交战各方是否有能力忍受经济破坏和政治不稳定带来的痛苦，以及控制战争升级的影响。但是，即使避免了最坏的结果，任何形式的高强度战争的前景似乎都不可避免地十分黯淡。
What follows are some possible conflict situations involving Chinese and U.S. forces. These are meant to be illustrative of how high-intensity war under conditions of Chinese near global primacy could unfold. They are not predictions of what might actually happen. We will review the possibilities through a geographic outward progression, starting with China:
以下是一些涉及中美两国军队的可能冲突情况。这些情况旨在说明在中国几乎占据全球主导地位的条件下，高强度战争可能会如何发展。它们并不是对实际可能发生的情况的预测。我们将从中国开始，通过地理上的向外发展来回顾这些可能性：
• The most likely triggers for high-intensity war would be the persistent flash points that have antagonized China for years, but new ones could emerge over time. Chinese lead-ers could design an operation to attack Taiwan, with a primary objective of seeking to destroy U.S. military forces in the theater. China could also provoke a clash with U.S. allies and partners in Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines, Singapore, or other partners, with similar goals in mind. In either case, China’s war aims would regard as top priority the destruction of U.S. combat power throughoutthe theater. If China’s feuds with Japan continued to escalate in the lead-up to war, China might also consider a massive strike against Japanese forces to cripple one of America’s most capable allies in the theater. The result could be a widespread war that begins with devastating preemp-tive strikes against U.S. and allied forces and facilities throughout the region.
最有可能引发高强度战争的是多年来一直与中国对立的持续热点，但随着时间的推移也可能出现新的热点。中国的主导者可能会设计一次攻击台湾的行动，主要目的是摧毁美国在台湾的军事力量。中国也可能出于类似目的，挑起与美国在东南亚的盟友和合作伙伴的冲突，如菲律宾、新加坡或其他合作伙伴。无论是哪种情况，中国的战争目标都会将摧毁美国在整个战区的战斗力视为重中之重。如果中国与日本的恩怨在战前继续升级，中国也可能考虑对日本军队发动大规模打击，以削弱美国在战区内最有能力的盟友之一。结果可能是一场大范围的战争，一开始就对整个地区的美军和盟军及设施进行毁灭性的先发制人打击。
• In countries close to China’s borders, the PLA could carry out direct interventions to bolster the efforts of rebel groups and governments engaged with U.S.-backed forces. PLA ground forces augmented by strike aircraft and missile forces could spearhead attacks against U.S.-backed governments or could, alternatively, augment governments friendly to China in their efforts to battle U.S.-backed insurgents. U.S. military forces operating in those regions could find themselves engaging directly with PLA forces. The most plausible areas for some form of U.S.-China combat would be Thailand, Vietnam, and other countries in Southeast Asia owing to the strategic and economic importance of that region to both China and the United States.
在靠近中国边境的国家，解放军可以进行直接干预，以支持与美国支持的部队交战的反叛组织和政府的努力。解放军地面部队在攻击机和导弹部队的支援下，可率先对美国支持的政府发动攻击，也可协助与中国友好的政府打击美国支持的叛乱分子。
在这些地区开展行动的美军可能会发现自己与解放军部队直接交战，最有可能发生中美某种形式交战的地区是泰国和越南、 以及东南亚其他国家，因为该地区对中国和美国都具有重要的战略和经济意义。
• In Central Asian countries such as Afghanistan or Kazakhstan, China might send inter-vening forces against pro–United States governments or to help Chinese partner nations attack nonstate actors backed by U.S. power. In South Asia, Chinese military forces might fight alongside Pakistani forces against Indian troops. If the United States had built a security partnership with India, then U.S. forces could be involved as well. Chi-nese defensive conventional combat operations along its border regions could include the defense of Chinese territory against incursions, control of cross-border raids, and cyber defense activities. Offensive operations could include cross-border interventions to aid an embattled client state, incursions to pressure and threaten an adversary neigh-bor, cross-border raids, and targeted cyber strikes and missile strikes for punitive or operational purposes.
在阿富汗或哈萨克斯坦等中亚国家，中国可能会派遣干预部队对抗亲美政府，或帮助中国的伙伴国攻击美国势力支持下的非国家行为体。在南亚，中国军队可能会与巴基斯坦军队并肩作战，对抗印度军队。如果美国与印度建立了安全伙伴关系，那么美国军队也可能参与其中。中国在边境地区的常规防御作战行动可能包括保卫中国领土不受入侵、控制跨境袭击和网络防御活动。进攻性作战行动可包括越境干预以援助陷入困境的客户国、入侵以对敌国邻近地区施压和威胁、越境袭击，以及出于惩罚或作战目的的有针对性的网络打击和导弹打击。
Along the Indian Ocean, Chinese surface and subsurface naval forces could engage the naval forces of the United States and its partners, possibly including India. Outside these maritime spaces, China’s eagerness to secure the Indian Ocean route could lead it to deploy major joint combat formations to seize vital choke points near the Strait of Malacca.
在印度洋沿岸，中国水面和水下舰艇部队可能会与美国及其合作伙伴（可能包括印度）的海军部队交战。在这些海域之外，中国急于确保印度洋航线的安全，可能会部署主要的联合作战编队，以夺取马六甲海峡附近的重要咽喉。
• In the Middle East, Chinese joint expeditionary forces augmented by client military forces could attempt to seize and control vital choke points to threaten U.S. and allied access to energy, shipping, and other vital resources. With a de facto alliance with Russia, China could also rely more on overland routes to move larger combat forces, which could in turn motivate China to seek greater security in Central and South Asia. PLA forces could accordingly step up combat support to client states in those areas to counter nonstate threats or any groups aligned with the United States. The Persian Gulf and other vital choke points in the Middle East could prove to be the scenes of the most significant U.S.-China ground combat outside Southeast Asia.
在中东地区，中国的联合远征军在客户军事力量的支持下，可能会试图夺取并控制重要的咽喉要道，威胁美国和盟国对能源、航运和其他重要资源的获取。与俄罗斯结成事实上的联盟后，中国还可以更多地依靠陆路来调动更大规模的作战部队，这反过来又会促使中国在中亚和南亚寻求更大的安全。解放军部队可以相应地加强对这些地区的客户国作战支持，以应对非国家行为体威胁或任何与美国结盟的团体。波斯湾和中东地区的其他重要咽喉可能会成为中美在东南亚以外最重要的地面作战地点。
• For Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, a China that had more closely approached a point of international primacy could have more options for combat operations than it does today. For example, Chinese military assets based on the Mediterranean coast in North Africa could support insurgents or client states in the Balkans against NATO- or U.S.-backed insurgents or governments. PLA forces on the coast of East Africa could engage passing U.S. naval and air assets. If U.S. missiles struck Chinese territory, Chi-nese strategic bombers could deploy from bases in West Africa to launch retaliatory strikes against the continental United States. Chinese naval ships that escorted mer-chant ships through the Arctic could engage U.S. naval ships in that area as well. If China and Russia became de facto allies, the PLA could more safely transport air and ground forces across Russian territory to support combat operations in eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Combined Chinese and Russian forces might operate together to intimidate NATO countries, fight U.S.-backed forces in the Middle East, or aim to control key choke points connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean.
就欧洲和地中海而言，一个更接近国际首要地位的中国可能比今天拥有更多的作战行动选择。例如，以北非地中海沿岸为基地的中国军事资产可以支持巴尔干地区的叛乱分子或客户国对抗北约或美国支持的叛乱分子或政府。解放军驻扎在东非沿岸的部队可以跟路过的美国海空军舰船飞机交战。如果美国导弹袭击中国领土，中国战略轰炸机可以从西非基地起飞，对美国本土发动报复性打击。护送商船通过北极的中国海军舰艇也可以在该地区与美国海军舰艇交战。如果中国和俄罗斯成为事实上的盟友，解放军就可以更安全地运送空军和地面部队穿越俄罗斯领土，以支持在东欧、中东和非洲的作战行动。中国和俄罗斯的联合部队可能会一起行动，恐吓北约国家，打击美国在中东支持的部队，或控制连接地中海和印度洋的咽喉要道。
• In a climate of major war featuring contested environments, the PLA would struggle to safely transport large volumes of military equipment to more distant locations. PLA bases, assets, and personnel in Africa, eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East could come under attack by U.S.-backed forces, and the PLA would probably strug-gle to defend them. To support its clients in these areas, China might be able to provide occasional shipments of lightweight assets such as air defense missiles, unmanned strike aircraft, and other portable weapons and equipment. Small numbers of PLA troops could also travel to help advise and direct the efforts of client militaries. But Beijing’s expectation would probably be that client states would bear the brunt of the fighting in these regions.
在以争夺为特点的大规模战争环境中，解放军将难以安全地将大量军事装备运送到更远的地方。解放军在非洲、东欧、拉美和中东的基地、资产和人员可能会遭到美国支持部队的攻击，解放军可能会竭力保卫这些基地、资产和人员。为了支持其在这些地区的客户，中国可能会偶尔运送一些轻型资产，如防空导弹、无人攻击机和其他便携式武器装备。少量解放军部队也可以前往帮助客户军队提供建议和指导。但中国政府的期望很可能是，这些地区的战斗首当其冲将由客户国承担。
Implications
提示
The shift to direct, large-scale conventional war would mark a major escalation that would probably change—and in dramatic fashion—the dynamics of U.S.- China conflict. A surge in casualties inflicted by the armed forces of the rival military would probably drive threat per-ceptions to extreme levels, incentivizing both sides to carry out a more extensive mobilization of the populace. Defense spending would likely receive top priority, and efforts to counter other threats would be accordingly downgraded in priority. Leaders might become receptive to increasingly risky measures in hopes of achieving a decisive victory. How the war might evolve beyond the opening clashes is impossible to predict.
向直接、大规模常规战争的转变将标志着美中冲突的重大升级，可能会戏剧性地改变美中冲突的态势。敌对双方军队造成的伤亡激增可能会将威胁感推向极端，促使双方对民众进行更广泛的动员。国防开支可能会成为最优先考虑的问题，而应对其他威胁的努力则会相应地降低优先级。为了取得决定性的胜利，领导人可能会接受越来越冒险的措施。战争在初期冲突之后会如何发展，目前还无法预测。
The enormous economic dislocation and potential destruction caused by major war would provide a strong incentive for both sides to seek a rapid and decisive victory, but achieving such a victory could prove as illusory to the combatants as it frequently has in past wars of power transition. War could persist until major exogenous shocks or developments finally exhausted the resources and will of one side or the other. Given their nuclear arsenals and vulnerability to crippling strikes to vital economic and strategic assets in cyberspace and outer space, as well as to long-range conventional strikes, projecting the potential escalation of major U.S.-China war seems hazardous at best. At the very least, escalation to include destructive strikes in one, some, or all these domains cannot be ruled out. As in past con-flicts, third parties could see opportunities in the war and seek out alliances with one side or the other as well. In short, the war would very likely be a multilateral one featuring opposing coalitions of countries from multiple continents. The war could prove long lasting and highly destructive. The ability of both capitals to avoid escalation to the highest levels of devastation remains far from clear.
大规模战争造成的巨大经济失调和潜在破坏将强烈刺激双方寻求快速、决定性的胜利，但对交战双方来说，取得这样的胜利可能就像在过去的权力交接战争中经常出现的那样是虚幻的。战争可能会持续下去，直到重大的外来冲击或事态发展最终耗尽一方或另一方的资源和意志。鉴于中美双方都拥有核武库，而且在网络空间和外层空间的重要经济和战略资产以及远程常规打击方面都很脆弱，预测美中战争的潜在升级充其量也只是危险的。至少，不能排除在一个、一些或所有这些领域进行破坏性打击的可能性。与过去的冲突一样，第三方可能会在战争中看到机会，并寻求与一方或另一方结盟。简而言之，这场战争很可能是一场多边战争，由来自多个大洲的国家组成对立联盟。这场战争可能会持续很长时间，并极具破坏性。两国政府是否有能力避免战争升级到最严重的破坏程度，目前尚不清楚。
